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In recent years there has been a considerable increase in Article 9 cases heard by the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). As a result, academic literature dedicated to 
the discussion of freedom of thought, conscience and religion has grown significantly. 
The majority of Article 9 cases have concerned the right to manifest religion or belief, 
therefore, this right has been subjected to considerable academic scrutiny. However, the 
Court has also considered a substantial number of cases concerning the right not to 
manifest religion or belief, yet, in comparison to the right to manifest, the right not to 
manifest has been almost completely neglected in the literature. This dissertation seeks, 
for the first time, to redress this imbalance.  
This dissertation adopts the approach of close documentary analysis to explore 
the right not to manifest religion or belief. It juxtaposes both the case law of the ECtHR 
and the literature on this right, to critically analyse whether the right is understood 
coherently and protected consistently by the Court. It argues that the presentation of the 
right not to manifest is confused both in case law and the literature. It also contends that 
the treatment of this right by the European Commission on Human Rights (ECnHR) and 
the ECtHR has often been inconsistent. The Court, in particular, has tended to present 
the right not to manifest as an absolute right which cannot be limited by the state, yet, 
when it has applied the right to the facts of the case, it has often treated it as a qualified 
and subjected it to limitations. 
This dissertation offers some reasons for the inconsistencies. It also makes some 
recommendations for the improved understanding and protection of this right. It 
suggests that the right not to manifest should be reconceptualised as the right to refrain 
from disclosing religion or belief, and, should be conceived of as an absolute right when 






















The right to manifest religion or belief is clearly set out in Article 9 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR),1 is well established 
in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’ or ‘the Court’)2 
and, in recent years, has been discussed at great length in the related literature.3 This 
contrasts sharply with the right not to manifest religion or belief. Whilst this right is not 
explicitly mentioned in Article 9 it does form part of this article and a significant 
number of ECtHR cases have revolved around this right.4 It is striking, however, that 
compared to the right to manifest, the right not to manifest has been almost completely 
neglected in the literature on Article 9.  
Article 9 is formed of two limbs. Article 9.1 states that this right includes 
freedom to change religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with 
others and in public or private to manifest religion or belief, in worship, teaching, 
                                                                
 
 
1 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950) 213 
UNTS 221, Article 9.  
2 See inter alia Pendragon v UK (1998) 27 EHRR CD 179; Dahlab v Switzerland ECHR 2001-V 42393; 
Leyla Sahin v Turkey ECHR 2005-XI 44774; El Morsli v France App no 15585/06) (ECtHR 4 March 
2008); Dogru v France ECHR 2008 27058; Aktas v France App no 43563/08, Bayrak v France App no 
14308/08, Gamaleddyn v France App no 18527/08, Ghazal v France App no 29134/08, J. Singh v France 
App no 25463/08 and R Singh v France App no 27561/08 (ECtHR 17 July 2009); Arslan v Turkey (1999) 
21 EHRR 264; Eweida and others v United Kingdom (2013) 57 EHRR 8.  
3 Key texts include M D Evans, Religious Liberty and International Law in Europe (Cambridge 
University Press 1997); C Evans, Freedom of Religion under the European Convention on Human Rights 
(Oxford University Press 2001); P Taylor, Freedom of Religion: UN and European Human Rights Law 
and Practice (Cambridge University Press 2005) and R Sandberg, Law and Religion (Cambridge 
University Press 2011). 
4See inter alia Kosteski v Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia ECHR 2006 55170; Alexandridis c 
Grѐce App no 19516/06 (ECtHR 21 February 2008) para 38; Dimitras et autres c Grѐce  App nos 
42837/06, 3237/07, 3269/07, 35793/07 and 6099/08 (ECtHR 3 June 2010); Sinan Işik v Turkey ECHR 
2010 21924, para 41; Grzelak v Poland ECHR 2010 7710, para 87 and Wasmuth c Allemange App no 
12884/03 (ECtHR 17 February 2011). This is a considerable amount given the relatively small number of 
Article 9 cases heard by the ECtHR. See European Court of Human Rights Public Relations Unit, ‘50 
Years of Activity: The European Court of Human Rights, Some Facts and Figures’ (ECHR 2010) 







practice and observance.5 Article 9.2 qualifies Article 9.1; it states that freedom to 
manifest one’s religion or belief shall be subject only to such limitations as are 
prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, 
for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights 
and freedoms of others.6 
Article 9 encompasses a wide variety of rights. These rights are generally 
divided into forum internum and forum externum rights.7 Forum internum rights relate 
to the internal realm of freedom of religion or belief and include the right to hold and to 
change religion or belief.8 In contrast, forum externum rights relate to the external realm 
of freedom of religion or belief and consist of the freedom, either alone or in community 
with others and in public or private, to manifest religion or belief in worship, teaching 
practice and observance.9   
 Despite the variety of rights in Article 9, however, the rapidly growing body of 
academic literature on the topic of freedom of thought, conscience and religion 
concentrates almost exclusively on the forum externum right to manifest religion or 
                                                                
 
 
5 This is identical to Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and Article 18.1 
of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), see Universal Declaration on 
Human Rights, GA Res. 217A (III), UN Doc. A/3/810 (1948), Article 18; International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, GA Res 2200A (XXI) 21 UN GAOR Supp (No 16), UN Doc A/6316 (1966), 999 
UNTS 171, Article 18. 
6 This has considerable similarities with ICCPR Article 18.3 and ECHR Article 9.2, see ibid.  
7 C Evans (n3) 72-73; P Taylor (n3) 19; J Dingemans, C Yeginsu, T Cross and H Masood, The 
Protections for Religious Rights Law and Practice (Oxford University Press 2013) 81; W Fuhrmann, 
‘Perspectives on Religious Freedom from the Vantage Point of the European Court of Human Rights’ 
(2000) Brigham Young University Law Review 829, 831; J Martinez-Torron, ‘The (Un)protection of 
Individual Religious Identity in the Strasbourg Case Law’ (2012) Oxford Journal of Law and Religion 1, 
3. 
8 Van den Dungen v Netherlands (1995) DR 80; CJ, JJ and EJ v Poland (1996) DR 84, 46. For comment 
see inter alia B Tahzib, Freedom of Religion Or Belief: Ensuring Effective International Legal Protection 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1996); C Evans (n3) 72-79; Taylor (n3) 116ff;  N Bratza, ‘The ‘Precious 
Asset’: Freedom of Religion Under the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2012) 14 (2) 
Ecclesiastical Law Journal 256, 259; L Peroni, ‘Deconstructing ‘Legal’ Religion in Strasbourg’ (2013) 
Oxford Journal of Law and Religion 1, 3  







belief and the legitimacy of state restrictions upon this right. This is largely the result of 
a number of high profile cases concerning government limitations on manifestation of 
religion or belief in public - particularly the wearing of religious symbols and clothing, 
in education and employment10- heard by the ECtHR since the turn of the century. Such 
cases have received extensive media coverage11 and provoked much political12 and 
public debate.13   
However, like the right to manifest, the right not to manifest has also been 
increasingly claimed before the ECtHR. Applicants have complained that they have 
been forced to reveal their religion or belief, or have had it revealed on their behalf 
without their consent, by the state in various contexts including the courtroom,14 in 
education15 and in the provision of identity16  and wage tax cards.17 However, these 
cases have received precious little attention in comparison to right to manifest cases; 18 
                                                                
 
 
10 See Sinan Işik v Turkey (n4); Eweida and others v United Kingdom (n2). 
11 See for instance, D Barrett, ‘Christians have no right to wear cross at work, says Government’ 
(Telegraph 10 March 2012) <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/religion/9136191/Christians-have-no-
right-to-wear-cross-at-work-says-Government.html> access August 2014; BBC, ‘British Airways 
Christian Employee Nadia Eweida Wins Case’ (BCC News UK 15 January 2013) 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-21025332> accessed August 2014. For discussion of the role of the 
media in this respect see N Cox ‘Religious Tolerance, the News Media and Respect for the Theist’ in N 
Spencer (ed) Religion and Law (Theos 2012).  
12 For a discussion of policy concerns see J Dingemans (n7) 80; C McCrudden, ‘Religion, Human Rights, 
Equality and the Public Sphere’ (2011) 13 (1) Ecclesiastical Law Journal 38. In SAS v France, for 
instance the Court considered Resolution 1743 (2010) and Recommendation 1927 (2010) of the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on Islam, Islamism and Islamaphobia. See SAS v 
France ECHR 2014 43835. 
13 Sandberg suggests that such cases create ‘moral panic’, see R. Sandberg, Religion, Law and Society 
(Cambridge University Press 2014) 49,148,153,159. See also C McCrudden (n12) 38.  
14 Alexandridis c Grѐce (n4); Dimitras et autres c Grѐce (n4); Dimitras et autres c Grѐce App nos 
34207/08 and 6365/09 (ECtHR 2 November 2011); Dimitras et autres c Grѐce App nos 44077/09, 
15369/10 and 41345/10 (ECtHR 8 January 2013). 
15 Saniewski v Poland App no 42393/98 (ECtHR 15 February 2001); Grzelak v Poland (n4). 
16 Sinan Işik v Turkey (n4). 
17 Wasmuth c Allemange (n4). 
18 The most prominent texts are J Dingemans (n7); L Peroni (n8); R C A White R C A and C Ovey, 








perhaps this is because the majority of these cases are unreported19 and available only in 
French.20  
It is concerning that the right not to manifest has largely been ignored outside of 
ECtHR case law itself. Firstly, it is tremendously difficult to ascertain what this right 
actually protects. Secondly, the nature of this right, in terms of its place in the forum 
internum/ forum externum distinction, is not clear. And finally, there seems to be a 
distinct lack of clarity with respect to the ECtHR’s treatment of this right when it 
applies it to the facts of each case.   
The robust academic debate concerning the right to  manifest has been, and 
continues to be, extremely useful in identifying the meaning, scope and nature of the 
right to manifest and the principles developed and consolidated by the Court in respect 
of its protection.21 Moreover, such doctrinal research has drawn attention to problems in 
terms of the protection of the right to manifest by the Court, for instance, conceptual 
confusion surrounding key terms such as ‘manifestation’ and the ‘margin of 
appreciation’ has been highlighted.22  
The aim of this dissertation, therefore, is to conduct a systematic analysis of the 
meaning, scope and nature of the right not to manifest and an evaluation of the way in 
which this right has been protected by the ECtHR in order to ascertain whether the right 
                                                                
 
 
19 Unreported cases are not available in Law Reports, such as the European Court of Human Rights 
Reports of Judgments and Decisions, but are available on the ECtHR database, HUDOC. References to 
unreported cases will be pinpointed by page number where possible.  
20 The following cases are available only in French: Alexandridis c Grѐce (n4); Dimitras et autres c Grѐce 
2010 (n4); Dimitras et autres c Grѐce 2011 (n14); Dimitras et autres c Grѐce 2013 (n14); Wasmuth c 
Allemange (n4).  
21 J Murdoch, Protecting the Right to Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion under the European 
Convention of Human Rights (Council of Europe 2012) 6. 
22 C Evans and P Taylor have argued that the Court gives too much deference to states by relying heavily 







not to manifest is understood coherently and protected consistently.23 It is anticipated 
that this research will complement research on the right to manifest religion or belief. In 
light of the above, the research questions for this dissertation are as follows: what is the 
meaning and scope of the right not to manifest? What is the nature of the right not to 
manifest and how can it be interfered with? And, how and why has the right not to 
manifest been protected by the Court?24  
Methodology 
In order to address these questions this dissertation will adopt the legal methodology of 
close documentary analysis. Firstly, this is the most appropriate methodology for 
conducting a technical evaluation of primary sources including Article 9 of the ECHR 
and European Commission on Human Rights (ECnHR)25 and ECtHR case law relevant 
to the right not to manifest religion or belief. As noted above, much of the relevant case 
law is available only in French, therefore it will be necessary to engage with these cases 
in their original language. In addition, secondary sources, largely in the form of 
academic comment on Article 9, will also be critically addressed. 
Secondly, this methodology is particularly well suited to a systematic analysis of 
coherency and consistency of legal doctrine with respect to the right not to manifest.  
                                                                
 
 
23 This dissertation has grown out of earlier conference papers on the topic: C K Roberts, ‘On the Right 
Not to Manifest Religion or Belief in Europe’ (Annual Law and Religion Scholars Network Conference, 
Cardiff University, 14 May 2013); C K Roberts, ‘The Other Side of the Coin: The Right Not to Manifest 
Religion or Belief in Europe’ (14th Annual AHRI Conference, Emerging Research in Human Rights, 
Human Rights Research  Students’ Conference, School of Advanced Studies, Human Rights Consortium, 
University of London, 11 Sept 2013) 
24 Note that this question asks specifically why it has been protected by the Court, not the wider question 
of why this right is protected; to answer this broader question it would be necessary to go beyond of the 
scope of this dissertation’s methodology. 
25  The ECnHR functioned until 1998. It acted as a ‘filter’ for the ECtHR deciding whether applications 
were admissible or inadmissible. Since 1998 applications have been declared inadmissible or admissible 
by the Court itself.  For further detail see J Martinez-Torron, ‘Religious Pluralism: The Case of the 
European Court of Human Rights’ in F Requejo and C Ungureanu (eds), Democracy, Law and Religious 







According to this perspective each case forms part a system of interrelated rules rather 
than unconnected decisions; it focuses on principles and precedents and traces their 
development through case law. The rigorous and detailed analysis of sources required 
for this approach is extremely useful in drawing attention to any conceptual ambiguities 
or contradictions with respect the right not to manifest.    
 Thirdly, this approach establishes clear boundaries for the research. Close 
documentary analysis can be criticised, inter alia for being rather narrow as it is 
somewhat insulated from external factors (such as social, economic, political and 
cultural factors) and considerations of how the law operates in practice. However, 
because the right not to manifest has been so neglected in the literature on Article 9, it is 
useful to begin with doctrinal analysis.26 In fact, whilst advocating an interdisciplinary 
approach, Sandberg has convincingly argued that a doctrinal analysis needs to come 
first.27 This methodological approach, therefore, will allow this research to contribute to 
the ongoing project of providing doctrinal commentaries on the Article 9 right to 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion.28  
Approach 
This dissertation will form five chapters. Chapter one will focus on Article 9 of the 
ECHR. It will begin the process of clarifying and explaining the meaning of key 
concepts in relation to Article 9, such as ‘religion’ and ‘belief’ and ‘forum internum’ 
and ‘forum externum’ which will be essential for the analysis of case law in relation to 
the right not to manifest in subsequent chapters. This chapter will also review the 
                                                                
 
 
26 J Smits views doctrinal scholarship as the core legal method. See J Smits Minds and Methods of Legal 
Scholarship (Edward Elgar 2012). 
27 R Sandberg (n3) 206-207. 







literature specifically relating to Article 9. The subsequent chapters will then explore the 
research questions. Chapter 2 will address the first research question concerning the 
meaning and scope of the right not to manifest, in terms of how the right is presented 
before it is applied to the facts of the case by the ECnHR and ECtHR, and, how it is 
described in the literature on Article 9. Chapter 3 will examine the second research 
question concerning the nature of the right not to manifest. It will assess whether the 
right not to manifest is considered to be a forum internum or forum externum right. 
Again it will analyse the presentation of this right in case law and the way in which it is 
described in the literature on Article 9. 
 Both Chapters Four and Five will focus on the third research question 
concerning the protection of the right not to manifest by the Court. It will therefore take 
into account the findings in Chapters Two and Three, in order to critically analyse the 
way in which the Court treats the right not to manifest when it applies this right to the 
facts of the case in question. A detailed analysis of case law, separated into Commission 
admissibility decisions and judgements of the ECtHR respectively, will be conducted in 
Chapters Four and Five in order for separate conclusions regarding these institutions’ 
approaches to be reached.   
Finally, the conclusions of each chapter will be brought together into an overall 




















Before embarking on an examination of the right not to manifest, it is necessary to 
explore Article 9 in some detail. In the ECHR, Article 9 is the key provision which 
protects the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.29 This section, 
therefore, will examine the structure of Article 9, definitions of the terms ‘religion’, 
‘belief’, ‘thought’ and ‘conscience’ and also the concepts forum internum and forum 
externum. 
Definition of Thought, Conscience, Religion and Belief 
Whilst the shorthand ‘religion or belief’ is used in respect of the right not to manifest, it 
is recognised that Article 9 protects not only ‘religion’ or ‘belief’, but also ‘thought’ and 
‘conscience’ too. The ECtHR has repeatedly stressed the importance of the right to 
freedom of thought conscience and religion both for personal identity and 
development30 and for the wellbeing of democratic societies.31 Yet, clear definitions of 
the terms ‘religion’, ‘belief’, ‘thought’ and ‘conscience’ are not offered by Article 9 nor 
                                                                
 
 
29 It is supported by Article 2 of the First Protocol which protects the exercise of religious freedom in 
education, particularly the rights of parents to ensure that the education of their children is in conformity 
with their own religious and philosophical convictions. Additional protection of thought, conscience and 
religion is provided by Article 8, the right to private and family life, Article 10 the right to public 
expression, Article 11 the right to peaceful assembly and association and also Article 14 which 
acknowledges that ECHR rights should be free from discrimination, including religious discrimination.  
30 Nussbaum recognises ‘to search for an understanding of the ultimate meaning of life in one’s own way 
is among the most important aspects of a life that is truly human’, see M C Nussbaum, Women and 
human development: the capabilities approach (Cambridge University Press 2000) 179. 
31 Kokkinakis v Greece (n4). For comment see P Edge, ‘Current Problems in Article 9 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights’ (1996) Juridical Review 46, 42; J Dingemans (n7) 979; P Danchin and L 
Forman, ‘The Evolving Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and the Protection of 
Religious Minorities’ in P Danchin and E Cole (eds) Protecting the Human Rights of Religious Minorities 







have they been established by the Court.32 It might be assumed that such definitions 
would be fundamental to the development of Article 9 case law but given the 
controversial nature of these terms it has been exceptionally difficult to reach any 
consensus;33 indeed there is no agreed definition in the literature.34 This is not an issue 
particular to Article 9; these terms have not been defined in other international human 
rights instruments which protect freedom of thought, conscience and religion.35 Most 
assistance is given in soft law, General Comment 22, which speaks of the right to 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion as ‘far reaching and profound’, noting the 
terms ‘belief’ and ‘religion’ are to be ‘broadly construed’, encompassing ‘theistic, non-
theistic and atheistic beliefs, as well as the right not to profess any religion or belief.’36 
The ECtHR has explicitly denied that it functions to determine what constitutes 
religion or belief.37 It has also denied that it can assess the legitimacy of particular 
                                                                
 
 
32 Several human rights instruments guarantee religion freedom but none define it. For comment see J 
Gunn, ‘The Complexity of Religion and the Definition of ‘Religion’ in International Law’ (2003) 16 
Harvard Human Rights Journal 189-190.  
33 Indeed Adhar and Leigh have argued that it is essential, see R Adhar R and I Leigh, Religious Freedom 
in the Liberal State (Oxford University Press 2013) 121. Definitions can certainly be useful. Sandberg 
sets out a number of reasons for definitions including consolidation, clarification, enlargement or 
limitation, see R Sandberg ‘Religion, Society and Law’ (PhD Thesis, Cardiff University 2010), 85. See 
also F A R Bennon, Statutory Interpretation: A Code (4th edn, Butterworths 2002) 479. 
34 For definitions see inter alia N Smart, The Philosophy of Religion (Oxford University Press 1979); K 
Greenawalt, ‘Religion as a Constitutional Concept’ (1984) 72 California Law Review 753; P W Edge, 
Legal Responses to Religious Difference (Kluwer Law International, 2002) 5-17. 
35  This has been observed by C. Evans (n3) 51, 59-61; M D Evans ‘Human Rights, Religious Liberty, 
and the Universality Debate’ in R O’Dair and A Lewis (eds) Law and Religion (Oxford University Press 
2001) 209. 
This, however, is not unusual in the human rights context. As Slotte notes, ‘open-endedness is a 
consequence of the kind of formulations of international treaties that parties in the deliberations have been 
able to agree to’, see Slotte P, ‘Securing Freedom Whilst Enhancing Competence’ (2011) 6 Religion and 
Human Rights 41. 
36  General Comment No. 22 (48) UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4 (1993). For a detailed analysis of 
this document, see B G Tahzib (n8) 307–375. See also ‘Guidelines for Review of Legislation Pertaining 
to Religion or Belief’ prepared by the OSCE/ODIHR Advisory Panel of Experts on Freedom of Religion 
and Belief, in consultation with the Council of Europe’s Commission for Democracy Through Law 
(Venice Commission), adopted by the Venice Commission at its 59th plenary session (Venice, 18–19 
June 2004). 








beliefs or the way in which those beliefs are expressed; rather ‘[w]hat it considers taking 
a stand on are state interventions in people’s lives and whether these are justified.’38 
One technique used by the ECnHR and the ECtHR to sidestep complex questions of 
definition is to move quickly to, and concentrate largely upon, the legitimacy of 
restrictions on ‘manifestations’ according to the permissible limitations in Article 9.2.39   
It is, however, clear from the case law that the Court protects not only theistic, 
non theistic and polytheistic ‘classical’ religions40 but also to ‘new’ religious 
organisations such as the Church of Scientology.41 This variety indicates that the Court 
has a broad understanding of religion and does not necessarily equate it with belief in a 
god.42 Nevertheless, some scholars have argued, with some merit it must be said, that 
there are various other indications in case law that the Court has a particular, Judeo-
Christian, understanding of religion.43 
The Court has also recognised that Article 9 is a ‘precious asset’ for atheists, 
agnostics, sceptics and the unconcerned44 and has protected various convictional stances 
                                                                
 
 
38 P Slotte, ‘What is a Man if He Has Words But Has No Deeds? Some Remarks on the European 
Convention of Human Rights’ (2011) 11 Ars Disputandi 259, 261.  
39 M Evans (n3) 330-2. 
40 The Court has recognised inter alia Christianity in Steadman v UK (1997) EHRR CD 168; Buddhism in 
X v United Kingdom (1975) 1 DR 41; Hinduism in ISKON v UK App No 20490/92 (ECtHR, 8 March 
1994); Islam in X v United Kingdom (1981)22 DR 27; Judaism in D v France (1983)35 DR 199; Sikhism 
in X v UK (1982) 28 DR 5. 
41 Church of Scientology, Moscow v Russia (2007) 46 EHRR 304. 
42 For discussion of ‘legal religion’ see W F Sullivan, The Impossibility of Religious Freedom (Princeton 
University Press 2005) 3; L G Beaman, The Courts and the Definition of Religion: Preserving the Status 
Quo through Exclusion’ in A L Greil and D G Bromley (eds) Defining Religion: Investigating the 
Boundaries Between the Sacred and Secular (JAI 2003) 203; C Durham Jr. & B Scharffs, Law and 
Religion: National, International, and Comparative Perspectives (Wolters Kluwer 2010) 42.  
43 See broadly P Slotte (n38) and Cavanaugh’s argument that ‘a contingent power arrangement of the 
modern West [has been mistaken] for a universal and timeless feature of modern existence,’ see T 
Cavanaugh, The Myth of Religious Violence: Secular Ideology and the Roots of Modern Conflict (Oxford 
University Press USA 2009) 58.  







under Article 9 including Druidism, Veganism, Pacifism and Humanism.45  According 
to the Court, in order to constitute a ‘belief three requirements must be satisfied: it must 
attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance, must relate to a 
weighty and substantial aspect of human life and behaviour and must be worthy of 
respect in a democratic society and not be incompatible with human dignity.’46  
 In contrast to ‘religion’ and ‘belief’, there is very little case law concerning 
‘thought’ (perhaps because of the overlap with ‘opinion’ in Article 10)47 and 
‘conscience’, which usually only appears in the context of ‘conscientious objection’.48 
The Court has stated that ‘not all opinions or convictions constitute beliefs in the sense 
protected by Article 9(1) of the Convention,’ but further clarity has not been offered.49 
This is problematic because the framing of Article 9 has led to a debate about whether 
manifestation of ‘thought’ and ‘conscience’ is actually protected by this article.50  
Given the lack of consensus in respect of the meaning of the terms ‘religion’, 
‘belief’, ‘thought’ and ‘conscience’ in Article 9, they will be understood broadly in this 
dissertation. 
                                                                
 
 
45 See Pendragon v UK (n2); W v UK App no 18787/93 (ECtHR 10 February 1993); Arrowsmith v the 
United Kingdom (1978) 19 DR 5; Folgero and others v Norway ECHR 2207-VIII 15472 respectively. 
46 Campbell and Cosans v UK (1982) 4 EHRR 293, para 26. Hambler has suggested that  ‘sincerity’ and 
‘consistency’ have now become the crucial criteria for assessing whether or not a religion or belief is to 
be recognised as such for in order to access Article 9 protection, see A Hambler, ‘Establishing Sincerity 
in Religion and Belief Claims: A Question of Consistency’ (2011) 13 (2) Ecclesiastical Law Journal 146. 
This argument may, however, need reviewing in light of Eweida (n3) para 81.   
47 The concept of beliefs ‘is not synonymous with the words “opinions” and “ideas”, such as those 
utilised in Article 10...’, see Campbell and Cosans V UK (n46) para 36. 
48 A very restricted meaning was adopted in Johnston and others v Ireland (1986) Series A no 122.  
49 Pretty v United Kingdom ECHR 2002-III 2346 para 82.  
50 For comment on difficulties in distinguishing between manifestations of belief and expressions of 







The Forum Internum and Forum Externum 
It has been suggested that within the architecture of all the core freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion articles the ‘abiding and fundamental distinction to be observed 
at all times’ is that between the forum internum and forum externum.51 These concepts 
have become essential for understanding the nature of rights in Article 9. However, they 
are not actually found in the text of Article 9 itself, are referred to infrequently in case 
law and their scope is somewhat contentious in the literature.52 
The ECtHR has stated that ‘Article 9 primarily protects the sphere of personal 
beliefs and religious creeds, i.e. the area which is sometimes called the forum 
internum.’53 It is sometimes referred to as the ‘private sphere’ of religion or belief but 
this can be somewhat misleading because it is conceptually narrower than this; it means 
specifically the realm of internal thought, conscience, religion and belief of each 
individual.54 The forum internum is said to include (but is not restricted to) the right to 
hold or not hold55 and the right to change56 religion or belief. It has also been recognised 
that the forum internum encompasses a number of other rights, including the right not to 
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be  compelled to be involved in religious activities, or compelled to show allegiance to a 
religion or belief, even symbolically, against one’s will.57 
Article 9 also protects the forum externum which relates to the external, often 
collective dimension of freedom of thought, conscience and religion.58 It comprises the 
right to manifest one’s religion or belief in public or private59 and therefore has been 
referred to as ‘the sphere where personal beliefs and religious creeds are physically 
manifested.’60 Various tests have been developed by the Court to ascertain what 
constitutes as a ‘manifestation’. In Arrowsmith v United Kingdom it was stated that in 
order for ‘...an act which is inspired, motivated or influenced by a religion or belief’ to 
count as a ‘manifestation’ within the meaning of Article 9, it ‘must be intimately linked 
to the religion or belief in question’, but not necessarily a fulfilment of a duty mandated 
by a religion.’61 More recently the Court has spoken of the necessity of ‘a sufficiently 
close and direct nexus between the act and the underlying belief’62 but there remains no 
fixed criterion for determining what counts as a ‘manifestation’.63 Essentially a 
manifestation is a ‘positive action’ taken by an individual on the basis of their religion 
or belief. 
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In sum, therefore, Article 9 protects both ‘the right to determine, at the 
individual and collective level, what one’s religion or belief is (forum internum) and the 
ways and importance of the manifestation of it (forum externum).’64 M. Evans has 
drawn a useful distinction between the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion which is ‘passive’ and the right to manifest a religion or belief which is 
‘active’.65   
 
Recognising the distinction between the forum internum and forum externum is 
not just important for understanding the nature of these rights; whether a right is a forum 
internum right or a forum externum right is of legal significance (and thus crucial to the 
Court) because the scope and type of State action is understood differently in relation to 
each of these.66 Unlike forum externum rights, forum internum rights, such as the right 
to hold, or change a religion or belief, cannot be subject to limitations under Article 
9.2.67 Any interference with these, so called ‘passive’, forum internum rights by the 
state -except during war or other national emergency- is considered an abuse of state 
power.68 As Slotte neatly put it, ‘a man who has faith but no deeds is a believer who 
enjoys absolute protection under human rights law.’69 
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Given that forum internum rights in Article 9 relate to the internal sphere of 
religious freedom, it may seem questionable how they can ever be interfered with by the 
state. It was common to assert that forum internum rights could only be affected by 
invasive and dystopic State action. Krishnaswami, for instance, considered any 
intervention in this domain to be not only illegitimate but ‘impossible’ except for 
‘invasive mind-altering techniques, such as brainwashing or systematic 
indoctrination’.70 Indeed, the Travaux Preparatoires reveal Article 9.1 was conceived of 
as a ‘bulwark against the dehumanizing techniques adopted in a police state.’71 
Furthermore, in the case of Kalac v Turkey the Court actually used such a narrow 
definition of freedom of religion, it was, as C. Evans noted, difficult to ‘see how any but 
the most totalitarian State could breach it.’72 Together, this led scholars such as M. 
Evans to conclude that ‘[p]rovided that individuals are able to continue in their beliefs, 
the forum internum remains untouched and there will be no breach of Article 9(1)’.73  
However, these statements are questionable in several respects; principally they 
reflect a narrow understanding of the forum internum as relating solely to the right to 
hold and to change a religion or belief. Using a wider understanding of the forum 
internum Tazhib suggested that in addition to the use or threat of physical force or 
prosecution to compel individuals to hold to, recant or convert from, their religion or 
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belief74 - which are clear violations of the forum internum-75 the state could also 
interfere with this forum though discrimination on the basis of holding or not holding a 
certain religion or belief, prohibition on membership of certain religions or beliefs under 
law and compulsion to reveal one’s religion or belief or to have it revealed without 
one’s consent.145  
This analysis is more congruent with the developments in case law over the past 
fifteen years; the forum internum is now understood to encompass a number of 
additional rights which can be violated in various ways. Broadly speaking, compulsion 
in the realm of religion or belief is considered to be a forum internum issue. Article 9 
protects the right to be able to make choices with respect to religion or belief 
voluntarily, without any sort of compulsion;76  the ECtHR has found therefore that in 
addition to indoctrination and coercion to change religion, compulsion to act contrary to 
one’s conscience and to be involved in religious activities also constitute interferences 
with the forum internum.77  
In contrast to forum internum rights, the so called ‘active’ forum externum right 
to manifest is a qualified right and can be limited for the reasons listed in Article 9.2. 
Article 9.2 is similar to limitation clauses in other qualified ECHR articles, such as the 
right to respect for private and family life (Article 8), but is much less permissive, 
which indicates the drafters of the ECHR thought the right to manifest should only be 
limited in a small number of circumstances.78 Given that manifestations of religion or 
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belief are in the forum externum they may have societal consequences which necessitate 
state regulation. This is illustrated by the case of a nurse who’s right to manifest –
through wearing a cross around her neck – was limited on the basis of the health and 
safety of staff and patients on a hospital ward.79 Theoretically, therefore, the division 
between forum internum and forum externum rights allows for ‘manifestations’ of 
religion or belief to be limited by the state in some instances ‘without undoing the right 
to freedom of religion itself.’80  
Despite this, it is debatable whether the distinction between the fora is so clear 
in practice. In cases where a violation of Article 9 is claimed the Court tends to ask the 
following questions: is the form of religion or belief one which is protected by Article 
9? Does the alleged interference concern manifestation of religion or belief? And if so, 
is the interference with Article 9 justified according to the list of legitimate limitations 
in Article 9.2?81 These questions appear straightforward but the Court has struggled 
greatly with their application. There are numerous, separate but linked, debates 
concerning the Court’s approach to Article 9 cases, for instance, there are debates about 
the Court’s understanding of what constitutes ‘religion’ or ‘belief’, about what 
constitutes a ‘manifestation’ and its application of Article 9.2 limitations.82 Of most 
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relevance to the research questions here is the debate the Court’s sometimes confused 
application of the forum internum and forum externum distinction.83 
  C. Evans has criticised the ECnHR and ECtHR for treating the distinction 
between the forum internum and forum externum as ‘self evident and needing little in 
the way of explanation’ whereas in reality it has struggled to distinguish clearly between 
them.84 She argued that the opposition between belief and practice -as evidenced in the 
formulation in Kokkinakis v Greece (repeated in every Article 9 case since) which stated 
that freedom of religion entails, inter alia, freedom to hold or not to hold religious 
beliefs and to practice or not to practice a religion-85 is unhelpful because it failed to 
appreciate the intimate connection between belief and practice.86  More recently Petkoff 
has contended that human rights law has defined the reach of these spheres by 
‘overemphasizing their distinctiveness...’ and he stresses, instead, the interdependency 
of the fora.87  Indeed, it seems logical to recognise that these fora are inextricably 
linked, for instance, the right to hold a religion or belief implies the right to manifest 
this.88 The great extent to which beliefs impact on actions, however, has rarely been 
recognised explicitly by the Court.89 
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Yet, it can certainly be argued that on occasions the Court has struggled to 
distinguish between forum internum and forum externum rights. It has, as Gursel has 
pointed out, sometimes viewed the forum internum right to have (or not have) a belief 
and the forum externum right to manifest it, as synonymous.90 Evidence of the Court’s 
confusion concerning the engagement of the forum internum or forum externum is well 
illustrated by Buscarini v San Marino.91 In this case the applicants complained they had 
been forced to swear an oath on the Christian Gospels in order to take their seats in 
Parliament; this, they claimed, was a ‘premeditated act of coercion’ directed at their 
freedom of conscience and religion and demonstrated that the exercise of a fundamental 
political right was subject to publically professing a particular faith.92 The Court 
recognised the requirement to take an oath on the Gospels was equivalent to obliging 
the applicants to ‘swear allegiance to a particular religion’ which it stated was not 
compatible with Article 9.93 
 It seems therefore that this complaint should have been treated as engaging the 
forum internum right to hold or not to hold a religion or belief. However, it was treated 
as a forum externum right to manifest complaint. Limitations applicable only to forum 
externum rights were therefore considered and it was decided that in this case, the 
limitations could not be regarded as ‘necessary in a democratic society’; this approach 
was highly confusing given the applicants had not complained of a limitation on the 
right to manifest but rather that they had been forced to swear allegiance to a religion 
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that was not their own.94  The language of manifestation, therefore, seems inherently 
inappropriate here. There is a distinct sense that the right to manifest means the right to 
manifest one’s own religion.95 In Buscarini the applicants were compelled to publically 
swear allegiance a religion that was not their own. It seems more logical to view this as 
engaging the forum internum right not to hold a religion or belief.  
C. Evans attempted to make sense of Buscarini through a consideration of 
‘active’ and ‘passive’ rights. She applied M. Evans’ distinction between active and 
passive elements of Article 9 to the right to manifest itself. She explained that the forum 
externum ‘right to manifest a religion can be exercised in both an active and passive 
manner’; whilst the active aspect is formed of an individual asserting a right to act in a 
particular way, the passive aspect is formed of an individual asserting a right not to act 
in a particular way.96  C. Evans seems to have understood passive rights to be the direct 
opposite of the active rights to right manifest religion or belief in worship, teaching, 
practice or observance.  This appears congruent with the ‘right to practice or not to 
practice’ mentioned in the Kokkinakis judgment97 and case law in which, for instance, 
the right to participate in religious education includes the right not to participate of 
religious education.98 This led her to conclude, however, that compulsion to take a 
religious oath in Buscarini did not constitute a passive right to manifest99 because the 
right not to be required to swear on the Gospels did not correspond to one of the forms 
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of ‘active’ manifestation in Article 9.1. Instead, therefore, she argued that in Buscarini 
there was an interference with the forum internum right to hold or not hold a religion or 
belief.100  
C. Evans, Taylor and Murdoch have all used Buscarini as example of the 
Court’s improper treatment of forum internum complaints as forum externum 
complaints.101 This mischaracterisation of complaints is not just of academic concern 
but important in practice because it could have a real impact in terms of the protection 
of forum internum rights. As Taylor has rightly noted, one risk of treating coercion 
complaints as manifestation complaints is that applicants are obliged to prove that their 
non compliance with the law expressed their religion or belief and, therefore, that the 
practice of their religion or belief was illegitimacy restricted according to Article 9.2.102  
In reality, however, applicants who complain of compulsion usually protest against 
being compelled to do something (i.e. take a religious oath) which would not constitute 
a manifestation of their religion or belief; such an mischaracterisation of the issue can 
therefore pose ‘an insurmountable hurdle’ to justice.103 In Buscarini this was not the 
case because a violation of Article 9 was found despite the unsatisfactory reasoning. 
However it must be noted that the Court’s approach meant the decision rested on the 
question of the legitimacy of the interference alone; if the Court had treated it as a forum 
internum right to hold or not to hold a religion or belief instead, the question of the 
legitimacy of interference would not have arisen at all.104 
                                                                
 
 
100 Ibid.  
101 C Evans (n3) 73; P Taylor (n3) 116ff; Murdoch (n21) 14-15. 
102 P Taylor (n3) 127. 
103 Ibid. 







Overall, academics have argued that the Court has a poor understanding of 
forum internum rights and the ways in which they can be interfered with by the state. C. 
Evans has argued that the ECnHR and ECtHR have failed to take the forum internum 
seriously thus allowing States act ‘very repressively’ before finding an interference with 
the forum internum.105 In addition, Taylor has contended that the Court has not 
developed ‘clear or consistent principles’ to enable forum internum rights to be 
recognised106 and this has undermined the ‘absolute, unimpugnable and fundamental 
nature of the forum internum’ through the ‘persistent avoidance of principles that permit 
the forum internum rights to be asserted by applicants’.107  
The question now is whether these texts are still relevant. They are certainly in 
need of review in light of the numerous Article 9 cases which have been heard by the 
Court since their publication. Recently, for instance, Peroni has argued that the Court 
protects the forum internum very strongly indeed.108 The following chapters will 
explore which of these analyses are correct, if any, with respect to the right not to 
manifest religion or belief.  
Conclusion  
This introductory chapter has explored the meaning and scope of Article 9, the terms 
religion, belief, thought and conscience the concepts forum internum and forum 
externum. It has found that there is considerable ambiguity in relation to the 
understanding and application of these key concepts. It has identified serious issues 
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concerning the Court’s ability to distinguish between the fora in practice. This chapter 
has, therefore, drawn attention to the lack of clarity with respect to the understanding 
and application of fundamental concepts in Article 9. This provides a background 
against which the coherency of understanding and consistency of protection of the right 












































This chapter will address the first research question concerning meaning and scope of 
the right not to manifest, in terms of how the right is presented before it is applied to the 
facts of the case by the ECnHR and ECtHR, and, how it is described in the literature on 
Article 9. It must be noted that in contrast to the right to manifest, which is mentioned 
twice in Article 9, the right not to manifest is not mentioned at all. However, it has been 
recognised as forming part of this article109 and a significant number of ECtHR cases 
have revolved around this right.110 The lack of explicit reference to the right not to 
manifest is not unusual in the context of the ECHR. Rights ‘not to’ or ‘negative’ rights 
are not clearly set out in any Convention articles even though it is generally understood 
they are in inherent within many of them.111 For instance, the ECtHR has held the right 
to join trade unions (protected under Article 11) includes the right not to be compelled 
to join an association.112 Similarly, ‘negative’ rights have been upheld in the context of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), for example, it has 
been observed that the right to refuse to divulge one’s ideas is part of the right to hold 
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an opinion.113 However, having said this, rights ‘not to’ are rarely referred to in the 
literature on the ECHR and there is no consensus on the meaning of ‘negative’ rights.  
This section will explore whether the right not to manifest can be considered the 
opposite side of the coin, conceptually speaking, to the right to manifest religion or 
belief.  
Understanding of the Right Not to Manifest in Case Law 
In law, there is always a gap between the text and the meaning.114 However, given that 
concepts derive meaning from the concepts with which they are associated, it is sensible 
to analyse the right not to manifest in light of the right to manifest. In both Article 9.1 
and 9.2 the verb ‘to manifest’ -a transitive verb which expresses an action in relation to 
a direct object (in this case, religion and belief)- is used in its infinite form. Article 9 
protects the ‘freedom to manifest religion or belief in worship, teaching, practice and 
observance’ both in public and private.115 Active exercise of the right to manifest is 
usually performed externally, directed to the outside world;116 indeed, Kokkinakis 
speaks of ‘bearing witness in words and deeds’.117 There has been much case law 
concerning state limitations on this right and even state pressure on individuals not to 
manifest religion or belief.118 Given this ‘active’ nature of the right to manifest, does the 
right not to manifest mean the right not to act in certain ways?  
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I. Interpretation One: not to be coerced to act in certain ways 
The right not to manifest has not, so far, been used in ECtHR case law to refer to the 
choice whether to manifest or not to manifest one’s own religion or belief in worship, 
teaching or practice.119 It has, however, been used in the context of forced 
‘manifestation’ of convictions or opinions contrary to one’s own.  
In both Valsamis c Grѐce and Efstratiou c Grѐce the applicants complained that 
being disciplined for refusing to participate in a school parade on Greek National Day -
on the basis that it contradicted their pacifist beliefs as Jehovah’s Witnesses- violated 
their right to manifest religion or belief under Article 9.120 In the summary of the 
applicants’ arguments the ECtHR stated in each case that the applicant asserted that 
Article 9 ‘guaranteed her right to the negative freedom not to manifest, by gestures of 
support, any convictions or opinions contrary to her own.’121 The appeal to the forum 
externum right to manifest and the use of the language of manifestation - in the form of 
the ‘negative freedom not to manifest’ - in this case seems entirely inappropriate.122 It 
perhaps would have been more fitting to characterise it as a forum internum complaint 
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122 There is a debate about whether manifestation in Article 9 includes manifestation of thought or 
opinion. See also P Danchin and L Forman for a discussion of the difficulties of distinguishing between 







about coercion to act contrary to one’s conscience.123 In the earlier case of Darby v 
Sweden which concerned compulsion to pay church tax, the ECnHR widened the scope 
of the forum internum to encompass protection from being compelled to be involved in 
religious activities, or compelled to show allegiance to a religion or belief, even 
symbolically, against one’s will; the Commission stressed that resistance to coercion in 
this respect did not constitute a manifestation of any sort.124  
Despite the language of manifestation to describe the complaints, however, it 
seems that the complaints were treated as relating to a forum internum right in both 
Valsamis and Efstratiou.125 This is evident from the language of the decision; the Court 
ruled that the requirement to attend the school parade did not amount to interference 
with the right to freedom of religion (because, in the Court’s opinion, it concerned 
’innocuous participation in a public function’126) and thus, like the Commission, found 
no breach of Article 9.127 It is also evident from the fact that there was no consideration 
of forum externum limitations under Article 9.2. However, that the phrase ‘not to 
manifest’ has not been used again in connection with coercion to act contrary to one’s 
conscience suggests that the Court misused this phrase in these two cases in 1996.  
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125 P Taylor (n3) 117. 
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As noted above manifestation both in public (i.e. in a community building) and private 
(i.e. in one’s home) is protected by Article 9.128 However, because ECtHR cases have 
largely turned on manifestation in public much less attention has been paid to 
manifestation in private. Slotte has questioned whether this has had the effect of 
‘...rendering manifestation logically irreconcilable with a private sphere of human life’ 
and points out that with respect to the private sphere the term ‘practice’ is now often 
used instead of ‘manifestation’.129 Interestingly, in her discussion of the ‘public/private’ 
distinction, Slotte commented that ‘to manifest’ can be rephrased as ‘to reveal’ or ‘to 
show’ among other things.130  
A broader interpretation of ‘to manifest’ certainly fits with both the syntax of 
Article 9.1 and the dictionary definition of ‘manifest’131 which reads ‘to make (a 
quality, fact, etc) evident to the eye or to the understanding; to show plainly, disclose, 
reveal.’132 Such an interpretation allows for forms of manifestation other than those 
listed in Article 9.1 to be encompassed. Importantly it may be understood to include 
disclosure of information relating to religion or belief. Indeed, some ‘right to manifest’ 
cases have actually turned on this interpretation; in X v United Kingdom the applicant 
complained that the failure of prison authorities to record his belief violated his right to 
manifest his religion or belief.133 Additionally, in Sofianopolous and Others v Greece 
                                                                
 
 
128 Kokinakkis v Greece (n4) para 31. In SAS v France the Court noted that Article 9 includes the right of 
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the applicants argued that the prohibition on disclosure of religion or belief on identity 
cards prevented them from manifesting their religion or belief.134 If the right to manifest 
can, therefore, be interpreted broadly as the right to reveal or disclose, can the right not 
to manifest be interpreted as the right not to reveal or disclose religion or belief? 
II. Interpretation Two: not to reveal or disclose religion or belief 
The ECnHR and ECtHR have heard numerous complaints in which the right not to 
reveal or disclose information concerning religion or belief has been claimed. 
Confusingly, there has been no conceptual consistency between or even within these 
cases with respect to the phrasing of this right. The following will examine ECtHR 
references to these rights in chronological order in order to trace any conceptual 
development.   
a. Right to remain silent as to one’s beliefs 
In the case of CJ, JJ and EJ v Poland, which concerned disclosure of religion or belief 
on school reports, both the applicants and the Court understood Article 8 as 
guaranteeing a right to remain silent about one’s convictions135 (which is different from 
‘the right to remain silent’136). Later, in Saniewski v Poland, in which the applicant 
complained that his school report forced him to ‘make a public statement of his beliefs’ 
contrary to Article 9, the Commission again spoke of ‘the right to remain silent as to 
one’s beliefs’.137 
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135 CJ, JJ and EJ v Poland (n8). 
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b. Right not to disclose or reveal one’s religion or belief 
The Court has also spoken of compulsion to ‘disclose’ or ‘reveal’ religion or belief. 
This formulation has similarities with the provision in General Comment 22.3 which 
states that ‘no one can be compelled to reveal his thoughts or adherence to religion or 
belief.’138 In Folgerø and Others v Norway, for instance, which concerned opting out of 
religious education, the Court noted obiter dicta that the obligation on parents to 
disclose detailed information about their religion or belief might mean that they would 
feel compelled to disclose or reveal their religion or belief.139  
c. Right not to manifest one’s religious belief 
The first appearance of the right not to manifest to mean disclosure of religion or belief 
was in Sofianopolous and Others v Greece; the applicants referred to the ‘negative 
aspect’ of the positive right to manifest religion or belief on identity cards, ‘in other 
words the right not to manifest them.’140 The phrase was next used in the same way in 
Spampinato v Italy in which the applicants, following a complaint about disclosure on a 
wage tax card, argued that ‘the right not to manifest one’s religious beliefs fell within 
the scope of Article 9 of the Convention’.141 In this case the Court spoke both of the 
obligation to indicate a religious affiliation and ‘an obligation to manifest one’s 
beliefs...’142  
 The case of Alexandridis c Grѐce was the first case in which the Court itself 
used the phrase the ‘right not to manifest’. The applicant complained that he had been 
forced to reveal his convictions in order to take an oath which infringed his right not to 
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manifest his convictions under Article 9.143 In response, the Court confirmed the 
existence of such a right, explaining that ‘freedom to manifest religious beliefs also has 
a negative aspect, namely the right of the individual not to be compelled to state his 
faith or his religious beliefs and not be forced to behave in a way which could be 
inferred that he held - or did not - such beliefs.144 In terms of the scope of this right, it 
covers both statements and acts respectively. Later in the judgment, this negative aspect 
was referred to as the ‘right not to be compelled to manifest religious beliefs.’145   
This presentation of the right not to manifest as the ‘negative aspect’ of the right 
to manifest implies that there is a positive right to state one’s faith and therefore 
provides support for the broader interpretation of ‘to manifest’ to mean ‘to reveal’ or ‘to 
disclose’. This formulation in Alexandridis has become the generally accepted way to 
refer to the right not to manifest in ECtHR cases from 2008 onwards. Conceptually 
speaking, therefore, Alexandridis marks a turning point in terms of the clarification and 
use of this phrase. 
In Sinan Işik v Turkey, which concerned the disclosure of religion or belief on 
identity cards, the applicant complained that ‘he had been obliged, without his consent 
and in breach of the right to freedom of religion and conscience, to disclose his belief 
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because it was mandatory to indicate his religion on his identity card.’146 This 
formulation may have been influenced by Article 24 of the Turkish Constitution which 
stated ‘[n]o one shall be compelled to....reveal his religious belief and convictions....’147 
In response to the complaint, the Court declared that it would examine this case ‘from 
the angle of the negative aspect of freedom of religion and conscience, namely the right 
of an individual not to be obliged to manifest his or her beliefs’.148 Elsewhere it used the 
phrase ‘the right not to disclose one’s religion or beliefs’149 interchangeably with the 
‘principle of freedom not to manifest one’s religion or belief’.150  
The Court also expanded on the separate elements of the right not to manifest –
namely disclosure through statements or acts- set out in Alexandridis; in Işik the Court 
explained the right not to manifest includes the right ‘not to be obliged to disclose his or 
her religion or beliefs’ and the right ‘not to be obliged to act in such a way that it is 
possible to conclude that he or she holds -or does not hold- such beliefs’.151 There was, 
therefore, a considerable lack of conceptual consistency in this case. Perhaps it indicates 
that the Court felt the formulation ‘the right not to manifest’ was not widely understood 
so complemented this phrase with references to ‘disclosing’ or ‘revealing’ religion or 
belief.    
Later in the same year, in Grzelak v Poland, the applicant complained that his 
religion affiliation had been revealed through his school report.152 The Court repeated 
the formulations set in Alexandridis in this respect but spoke mainly of the ‘right of 
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pupils not to be compelled...to reveal their religious beliefs of lack thereof’.153 It was 
only in the concluding sentence that the Court referred to the ‘right not to manifest 
religion or beliefs’.154  
The most recent case to use the ‘right not to manifest’ was Wasmuth c 
Allemange; the applicant complained that the requirement to indicate his religion or 
belief on his wage tax card infringed his right not to declare his religion or belief.155 
Again the framing of this complaint may have been influenced by national law which 
stated that ‘[n]o one is required to declare their religious beliefs’.156 In contrast to earlier 
cases, in this case the Court spoke only of the ‘right of the individual not to manifest his 
religious beliefs;157 it used no other formulation at all to describe this right.  
These cases seem to show a gradual trend from 2008 onwards towards a greater 
use of ‘the right not to manifest’ by the ECtHR. However, other formulations have 
remained prominent.  In fact, the three cases of Dimitras et autres c Grѐce in 2010, 
2011 and 2013, in which complaints were raised about religious oath taking, the Court 
did not use the formulation ‘the right not to manifest’ at all, rather spoke solely of the 
‘obligation to disclose or reveal religious beliefs’.158  It may well be that the conceptual 
inconsistency in the above cases reflects the particular constructions in the State 
Constitutions in question or perhaps represents linguistic variation on the part of the 
Court. However, given the frequent use of the language of ‘disclosure’ it is possible to 
argue that expressions referring to the ‘disclosure’ of religion or belief are preferred by 
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the Court over the expression ‘the right not to manifest’. It is certainly clearer to 
understand what the Court is referring to when it uses ‘disclosure’ and the language of 
disclosure, as opposed to the language of manifestation, seems to be much more suited 
to describe the imparting of information regarding religion or belief through either 
statements or acts.159 
Understanding of the Right Not to Manifest in the Literature 
Whilst there have been some references to the right not to be compelled to reveal one’s 
religion160 and to protection against compulsion to disclose one’s religion or belief161 in 
key texts on freedom of thought, conscience and religion, there has been almost no 
discussion of the meaning or scope of these rights in the literature. C. Evans touched 
upon these rights in her discussion of Bernard v Luxemburg but the discussion was 
limited.162 Even Taylor, who explicitly promised to discuss the right not to be 
compelled to reveal one’s religion or belief,163 provided very little actual discussion of 
this right and furthermore, the limited discussion focused largely on Human Rights 
Committee (HRC) decisions rather than ECtHR case law. Most recently, Clayton and 
Tomlison have stated that ‘[a]rticle 9 embraces a right to freedom from any compulsion 
to express thoughts or change an opinion or divulge convictions’ but have not explained 
what is meant by this right.164   
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Some texts, whilst not referring explicitly to the right not to manifest have been 
useful in highlighting the growth of right not to manifest cases and, therefore, give 
credence to this dissertation research topic. The new and now leading practitioner text 
on freedom of thought, conscience and religion by Dingemans and others describes a 
number of right not to manifest cases, but does not actually use the phrase ‘right not to 
manifest’ at all.165 In terms of gaining an understanding of the acceptance of this right 
(in its various formulations) across Europe Doe’s Law and Religion in Europe, which 
identifies shared principles in Europe, is most helpful. Doe identifies the right not to 
declare religion or belief166 as the eighth ‘Principle of Religion Law Common to the 
States of Europe’.167 It must be noted that given the purpose of his book, Doe’s 
emphasis is on European State Constitutions rather than ECtHR case law, however, his 
discussion of the way in which this right has been explicitly protected in various ways 
in the Constitutions of Spain, Slovenia, Romania is important as it serves to show that 
States such as Poland and Germany are not unusual in protecting this right explicitly in 
their Constitutions (as referred to in relation to the formulations used in Grzelak and 
Wasmuth, above).168  
There are very few explicit reference in the literature to the phrase ‘the right not 
to manifest’. Where it has appeared it is usually as a quotation from the judgments in 
Valsamis, Efstratiou, Işik or Grzelak and any discussion as to what this phrase means is 
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lacking.169  One exception is the new section entitled ‘A Right Not to Manifest a 
Religion’ in Jacobs, White and Ovey: The European Convention on Human Rights.170  
Whilst this section again gives weight to the growing importance of this right, it seems 
to demonstrate a seriously confused understanding of the meaning and scope of this 
right. It opens with the statement that ‘Article 9 also prevents a Contracting Party from 
imposing obligations on citizens in relation to participation in national life which offend 
their religious beliefs, unless these obligations are necessary in a democratic society.’171 
As argued above, this particular interpretation of ‘not to manifest’ is exclusive to 
Valsamis and Efstratiou. The cases described as ‘right not to manifest’ cases in this 
section of the book - including Buscarini, Dimitras, Işik and Grzelak - are not congruent 
with this 1996 interpretation of the phrase. As demonstrated above, Buscarini is a case 
either about the right to manifest (this is how the Court treated it) or a case about acting 
contrary to one’s conscience (this is how it is has been interpreted since). It is not a case 
about an obligation to participate in national life. Neither are Dimitras, Işik and 
Grzelak; in these cases the right not to manifest is synonymous with right not to reveal 
or disclose religion or belief through statements or acts. 
This section in Jacobs, White and Ovey: The European Convention on Human 
Rights is therefore considerably confused with respect to the meaning and scope of the 
right not to manifest. The explanation in this text book is misleading. Given that this of 
one of the leading textbooks on the ECHR for both students and practitioners, the lack 
of accurate and insightful commentary here is concerning.  
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Perhaps there has been reluctance in the literature to engage with cases which 
use the phrase the right to manifest (or its variants) because the majority of these cases 
are only available in French. They must, therefore, be analysed in their original 
language which may explain why there are very few references to this right and almost 
no analysis of related case law.  In light the points made in this section, now is the 
opportune time, therefore, to fill this gap in literature with an up to date and detailed 
examination of the right not to manifest which draws together the previous literature but 
also reviews this in light of the developments in case law in this field.  
 
Conclusion  
This section has explored the second research question concerning the meaning and 
scope of the right not to manifest, through a systematic engagement with ECtHR case 
law in which this phrase and its variants have been used. It has found that it is now well 
established that Article 9 includes not only a right to but also a right not to, manifest 
religion or belief but the meaning of this latter right is unclear.172  
This section has found that the phrase ‘not to manifest’ has been used to refer to 
the right not to be coerced to act contrary to conscience, but in recent years has become 
synonymous with the right to remain silent with respect to one’s religion or belief, the 
right not to be forced to reveal or disclose religion or belief or to be forced to act in such 
a way that religion or belief can be inferred.173 There has however been a remarkable 
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lack of consistency with respect to the use of the phrase ‘the right not to manifest’ in 
case law and a variety of alternative phrases have been used in conjunction with, and 
sometimes instead of, this phrase. The right has also been largely neglected in the 
literature on Article 9. Where it has been discussed the meaning of the right has been 
misrepresented. In light of the findings in this chapter, the next question to ask, 
therefore, is whether this conceptual variation and confusion on the part of the Court has 
























                                                                                                                                                                                            
 
 
but as Slottte has pointed out, evolve over time with respect to content as a result of case law, see P Slotte 













This chapter will examine the second research question concerning the nature of 
the right not to manifest. It will assess whether the right not to manifest is considered to 
be a forum internum or forum externum right according to the Article 9 framework. 
Again it will analyse the presentation of this right in case law and the way in which it is 
described in the literature on Article 9. It has been noted above that the right to manifest 
is a forum externum right. If the right not to manifest is opposite to the right to manifest 
in terms of nature then this would mean that it is a forum internum right. This chapter 
will explore whether this is the case.  
The Nature of the Right Not to Manifest  
Whilst there has been significant misunderstanding in the literature with respect to the 
meaning and scope of the right not to manifest, there has been remarkable consensus 
with respect to the nature of this right. Where academics have mentioned the right not to 
manifest (in its various forms) they have frequently stated that it is a forum internum 
right, according to which no State interference is ever legitimate. In 1984 van Dijk and 
van Hoof stated that the significance of the absolute guarantee of inner freedom of 
thought conscience and religion [the forum internum], implies that one cannot be 
subjected to ‘...any form of compulsion to express thoughts, to change opinion, or to 
divulge a religious conviction...’174 It has also been recognised as a forum internum 
                                                                
 
 







right by Taylor, who spoke of it as a ‘residual right’ of the forum internum175  and by 
Bratza who has stated that the internal dimension of freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion includes a ‘guarantee against a requirement to act in a manner contrary to one’s 
religious beliefs or even to manifest or disclose the nature of those beliefs.’176 Most 
recently, Harris, O’Boyle and Warbrick have emphasised that ‘the state must respect the 
right not to disclose one’s religion or belief because such an obligation falls within the 
forum internum of each individual.’177  
 Ascertaining the nature of the right not to manifest from case law, however, is 
somewhat more complicated than assertions in the literature suggest. Firstly, it is not 
immediately apparent from the way in which the right not to manifest has been framed 
in case law that it is a forum internum right. When the right not to manifest was first 
recognised by the ECtHR in Alexandridis it was described as the ‘negative aspect’ of 
the positive right to manifest; the Court explained that ‘the right to manifest religious 
beliefs also has a negative aspect namely the right of the individual not to be compelled 
to state his faith or his religious beliefs and not to be forced to behave in a way which 
could be inferred that he held - or did not - such beliefs.’178 This construction - ‘the 
negative aspect’ of the right to manifest – is somewhat problematic because it may be 
read as implying that the right not to reveal or disclose one’s religion is actually part of 
the right to manifest and thus also a forum externum right to which limitations under 
Article 9.2 apply. According to Doe it is the forum internum right to hold a religion or 
belief (rather than the forum externum right to manifest179) which encompasses the right 
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not to disclose religion or belief; this indicates that he also considers this right to be a 
forum internum right.180 However, he does point to the confused situation with respect 
to the nature of this right in a footnote in which he comments that the right not to reveal 
or disclose religion or belief can also be ‘conceived of as a form of manifestation’ but 
does not elaborate on what he means by this.181  
 The language in the rest of Alexandridis indicates that despite the 
characterisation as the ‘negative aspect’ of the right to manifest, the right not disclose 
religion or belief was conceived of as a forum internum right. Firstly, the Court clearly 
stated that it is ‘not permissible for State authorities to interfere with freedom of 
conscience of an individual by enquiring about his religion or belief, or obliging him to 
manifest his religion or belief, especially in the context of oath taking in order to 
perform certain functions.’182 The reference to ‘freedom of conscience’ in this statement 
firmly places the right not to manifest in the forum internum. Secondly, the terms 
‘compulsion’ and ‘obligation’ feature prominently in this case; such language highlights 
the involuntary nature of disclosure of religion or beliefs and highlights that it is a forum 
internum rather than forum externum issue.183 Thirdly, the fact that the statement 
regarding the impermissibility of State interference is not qualified in any way, further 
indicates that the Court considered the right not to manifest to be a forum internum 
right, with which interference is impermissible (thus clearly setting it apart from 
limitable forum externum rights).  
The first and only explicit reference to the forum internum nature of this right is in 
Işik. However, whilst it did refer to the right not to manifest elsewhere, at the point at 
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which the Court referred to the forum internum it stated that it was the ‘right not to 
disclose one’s religion or belief’ which fell ‘within the forum internum of each 
individual’.184 Perhaps there was a conscious avoidance of the language of 
manifestation in this statement in order to increase clarity. In this case the Court did not 
characterise the right not to manifest as a ‘negative aspect’ of the right to manifest 
religion or belief, so avoided the implication that it was part of the right to manifest. 
However, it did introduce the idea that this right constituted a ‘negative aspect’ of 
freedom of religion.185 It is not clear what the Court meant by this particular 
formulation, the ‘negative aspect of freedom of religion’.   
In light of the above, it is possible to reach the conclusion that the right not to 
manifest is generally understood to be a forum internum right; it is, therefore, the 
opposite side of the coin, in terms of its nature, to the forum externum right to manifest. 
However, the characterisation in Alexandridis of this apparently forum internum right as 
an aspect of the forum externum right to manifest was inherently problematic, and it 
was only possible to ascertain the forum internum nature of the right from an 
examination of semantics. Whilst the unequivocal statement in Işik, that the right not to 
reveal religion or belief is a forum internum right was helpful, it did not solve the 
problem of the nature of the of the right not to manifest entirely, because it introduced a 
new level perplexity in the phrase statement that the right constituted a ‘negative aspect’ 
of the ‘right to freedom of religion’.  
Such a lack of clarity on the part of the Court in respect to the nature of this right is 
concerning in terms of the protection of this right. As noted above, the forum 
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internum/forum externum distinction is of legal significance because the scope and type 
of state action is understood differently in relation to the two;186 whilst forum externum 
rights can be limited by the state in accordance with Article 9.2, state interference with 
forum internum rights is considered unacceptable. It is therefore essential for the Court 
to recognise at the outset in its judgements whether it is dealing with a forum internum 
or forum externum right.  
Interference with the Right Not to Manifest  
The central purpose of the ECHR is to protect individuals from illegitimate state 
interference.187 The legitimacy of state interference with the right to manifest religion or 
belief has been discussed and debated at length in the literature on Article 9.188 In 
contrast, almost no attention has been paid to situations in which the right not to 
manifest religion or belief could be violated. Pavone has commented that states should 
‘not contribute to an environment that pressures individuals to declare their religious 
affiliation...’ but he did not elaborate on this.189 Additionally, Slotte has mentioned that 
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coercion or compulsion to disclose religion or belief is also an interference with the 
forum internum but did not provide an example of this type of interference.190 
At the UN level, the current Special Rapportuer for Religion and Belief has 
commented that compulsory indication of religion affiliation on passports constitutes an 
abuse of freedom or religion or belief.191 Furthermore, during the drafting of General 
Comment 22.3 attention was drawn to areas in which the protection of freedom from 
compulsion to reveal one’s thoughts or adherence to religion or belief, could be 
problematic. It was suggested that the state may need information about an individual’s 
religion or belief in order to plan education, to prepare identity documents or to provide 
medical treatment.192 One delegate concluded that in light of these points the state could 
be authorised to ‘request such information when necessary’.193 There is, however, a 
significant difference between a request by the state for information concerning religion 
or belief and compulsion to reveal such information. Given that General Comment 22.3 
protects against compulsion to reveal, any exemptions were deliberately omitted by the 
delegates in the drafting of this provision.    
Conclusion 
This chapter has addressed the second research question concerning the nature of the 
right not to manifest. It has found that there is a general consensus in the literature that 
the right not to manifest is a forum internum right. However, it has found that the 
presentation of the nature of this right in the case law is much less clear. It has found 
that unnecessary confusion has been created by the description of the right as the 
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‘negative aspect’ of the right not to manifest or the ‘negative aspect’ of freedom of 
religion. However, as a result of an exploration of semantics in the case law it can be 
concluded that the right not to manifest is a forum internum right and therefore the 
opposite of the forum externum right to manifest.  
The confusion identified in both Chapter Two and Three with respect to the 
meaning, scope and nature of the right not to manifest raises the question of whether 
this has had an impact in terms of the protection of the right not to manifest by the 
Court. At this point, it seems fitting to pose a hypothesis: is it the case that if the 
meaning, scope and nature of the right not to manifest is not adequately understood then 
right not to manifest will not be adequately protected (i.e. as a forum internum right)? 





















CHAPTER 4: PROTECTION OF THE RIGHT NOT TO MANIFEST - 
ADMISSIBILITY DECISIONS OF THE COMMISSION  
Introduction  
Both Chapters Four and Five will focus on the third research question concerning the 
protection of the right not to manifest. Through an analysis of case law in which the 
right not to manifest (and its variants) have been raised explicitly, it will discuss 
complaints alleging that this right has been violated by the State and will critically 
evaluate the response of the ECnHR and ECtHR to these complaints. The cases for 
examination will be divided into admissibility decisions of the Commission and 
judgments of the ECtHR.  In both chapters cases will be examined chronologically in 
thematic groups in order to allow for trends to be identified not only through time but 
also in terms of the type of complaint made. Both chapters will also test the hypothesis 
that if the meaning, scope and nature of the right not to manifest is not adequately 
understood then right not to manifest will not be adequately protected as a forum 
internum right. 
This particular chapter will conduct a detailed analysis of Commission 
admissibility decisions concerning the right not to manifest relating to school reports 
and opting out of church tax.   
a. School Reports 
The right not to manifest has been raised, numerous times, in relation to school reports. 
In CJ, JJ and EJ v Poland the second and third applicants complained inter alia that 
their school reports for the year 1992/1993 had revealed their religion or belief and this 







Article 8.194 In response the Commission examined the complaints under Article 8 
(rather than Article 9), stating unequivocally that Article 8 protected the right to remain 
silent as regards to one’s convictions on religious matters. 
 In this case the Commission found that the religion or belief of neither the 
second, nor the third applicant, had been disclosed by their school reports. Firstly, given 
the second applicant’s report did not list the subject ‘religion/ethics’ at all, the fact that 
she had opted not to take these classes only became apparent when the report was 
compared with other pupils’ school reports. Secondly, the Commission reasoned that 
whilst there was a mark for ‘religion/ethics’ on the third applicant’s report, the layout of 
the report meant that it could not be deduced which of the two class had actually been 
attended. It therefore decided that these complaints were manifestly ill founded.   
The Commission’s treatment of the right not to manifest religion or belief in this 
case can be criticised. Firstly, it characterised the right as a qualified right under Article 
8 rather than a forum internum right under Article 9. This indicates a failure to 
recognise the meaning, scope and forum internum nature of the right not to manifest 
religion or belief, according to which no limitations are permissible. Secondly, 
disclosure of religion or belief in part was considered to be a relatively insignificant 
intrusion on privacy which could be justified under the qualified Article 8 right.  In fact, 
it noted that the act of choice with respect to the taking or not taking of religion or 
ethics classes as a school subject by its very nature involved to a certain degree a 
declaration as to the applicant’s preferences with respect to religion or belief without 
revealing his or her actual religion or beliefs. Whilst it must be conceded that this is true 
to some extent, as C. Evans has rightly pointed out, this reasoning in this case (that 
                                                                
 
 







disclosure in part was a relatively insignificant intrusion) fails to recognise that being 
forced to reveal religion or belief, even in part, to the state could have serious 
implications for the forum internum in certain religiously intolerant societies.195 
Later in 2001 in Saniewski v Poland another complaint about disclosure of 
religion or belief via a school reports was raised.196 The applicant complained inter alia 
that the absence of a mark for the course in religion on his 1996/1997 school report 
revealed that he did not follow this course and thus obliged him ‘to make a public 
statement of his beliefs’ breaching his freedom of thought and conscience (Article 9).197 
In response the Court examined the complaint under Article 9 but left the existence of 
the right not to manifest under this right an open question.198 This contrasts with the 
approach of the Commission in CJ, JJ and EJ v Poland in which the existence of a right 
to remain silent as to one’s religious beliefs was identified under Article 8.199 These two 
cases therefore display a lack of conformity regarding the Commissions’ approach and 
attitude towards to the right not to manifest.  
Nevertheless, the Court treated responded in a similar way in both cases. It 
reasoned that the school report in question left blank spaces listed for marks in other 
subjects such as ‘informatics’, ‘music’ and ‘fine arts’, and as such, it found that no 
conclusion could be drawn on the basis of the report as to whether the applicant refused 
to attend ‘religious/ethics’ classes or whether these were just not organised in his school 
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year.200 In addition, it noted that the applicant had not demonstrated that the school 
report would have ‘any material impact’ on his interests (i.e. that he would have to show 
it to future educational institutions or employers).201 Overall, it is not clear whether the 
Commission understood the right as a forum internum or forum externum right; it 
simply stated that there was no interference with the applicant’s rights and freedoms 
guaranteed by Article 9 of the Convention and it therefore rejected the complaint as 
manifestly ill founded.202 Again the Commission’s approach can be criticised here. The 
failure to recognise the existence of a right not to manifest religion or belief under 
Article 9, means that it is open to the same criticisms in this respect as outlined above in 
relation to CJ, JJ and EJ v Poland in which it was treated as an Article 8 right.  
b. Church Tax 
Whilst the right not to manifest was not explicitly raised in the case of Gottesmann v 
Switzerland, which concerned notification of change of religion in order to avoid 
payment of tax, it useful to note this case here. 203 In Gottesmann the applicant 
complained that ‘the domestic authorities arbitrarily imposed formalities governing the 
notification of their decision to leave the Roman Catholic Church....’204 In response, the 
Commission established that for the purposes of Article 9, domestic authorities have ‘a 
wide discretion’ in this respect and concluded that the imposition of the legal 
requirement to notify the State of a change of religion in order to administer the 
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payment of levies to a particular denomination did not constitute a violation of Article 9 
(1).’205  
As Taylor rightly noted, this decision was consistent with other decisions 
regarding the change of religious affiliation to be revealed in order to avoid the payment 
of such tax.206 However, what is interesting is that the Commission did not consider that 
such administrative arrangements oblige individuals to reveal their religion or belief to 
the state and therefore may interfere with the right to or the right not to manifest. Taylor 
suggested that it would have been useful if the Commission had offered some guidance 
on the role of such administrative formalities to prevent their misuse207  because, whilst 
‘notification of a change of religion may be an innocuous stipulation in most European 
countries’, in some it ‘could result in exposure to discrimination’.208 He suggested that 
the emphasis on the importance of protection against compulsion to reveal religion or 
belief both in General Comment 22.3 and also in the HRC’s periodic reports may lead 
to future ECtHR judgements taking into account the importance of compulsion to reveal 
one’s religion or belief ‘even if only for apparently harmless administrative purposes 
following a change of religious membership.’ 209 Whether this has been recognised by 
the ECtHR will be explored in the next chapter.   
Conclusion 
This section has explored the third research question concerning the protection of the 
right not to manifest in light of Commission admissibility decisions. It has found a great 
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deal of inconsistency in terms of this right; the right to remain silent as to one’s 
convictions has been treated as a qualified Article 8 right210 and its existence under 
Article 9 has been left an open question.  In terms of the hypothesis set out above, this 
chapter provides support for the view that if the meaning, scope and nature of the right 
not to manifest is not adequately understood then the right not to manifest is not 
adequately protected as a forum internum right.  
These cases also seem to provide evidence for the arguments made by C. Evans 
and Taylor with respect to the ECnHR’s and ECtHR’s poor protection of the forum 
internum. Writing in 2001, C. Evans argued that the Commission and the Court failed to 
recognise the importance of the forum internum and lacked a sophisticated 
understanding of the different ways in which the forum internum could be infringed so 
much so it played ‘almost no practical role in Article 9 cases.’211 In particular, Evans 
contended that the forum internum implications for individuals as a result of the state 
church system and in the education of children had been overlooked by the Court.212 
Later in 2005, Taylor argued that whilst it was recognised that protection against 
coercion formed part of the forum internum the Commission and the Court failed to 
recognise or protect other forum internum rights. As he rightly argued case law 
indicated that even compulsion to reveal one’s belief, widely considered to be a forum 
internum right, has been subjected to limitation provisions.213 This, he concluded, led to 
the ‘unimpugnable and fundamental nature of the forum internum to be undermined’.214 
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The next chapter will examine whether these analyses remain relevant to the protection 
of the forum internum right not to manifest in light of the more recent judgements of the 




































CHAPTER 5: PROTECTION OF THE RIGHT NOT TO MANIFEST – 




This chapter will examine ECtHR judgments relating to the right not to manifest 
religion or belief, concerning oath taking, identity cards, school reports and opting out 
of church tax. The hypothesis -that if the meaning, scope and nature of the right not to 
manifest is not adequately understood then it will not be adequately protected as a 
forum internum right- will again be tested in light of this case law. 
a. Oath Taking 
The first case to raise the right not to manifest in the context of oath taking was 
Alexandridis c Grѐce.215 In this case the applicant had been required to take an oath in 
order to be entitled to practice law.216 The oath was normally taken on the Christian 
Gospel but it was also possible to make a solemn declaration instead.217 Alexandridis 
complained inter alia about this process; he argued the structure, whereby the Christian 
oath was the ‘default’ option, meant that in order to make a solemn declaration he was 
obliged to reveal that he was not an Orthodox Christian.218 He claimed that this process 
infringed the right not to manifest religion or belief and thus claimed a violation of 
Article 8, 9 and 14 of the ECHR.219 
                                                                
 
 
215 Alexandridis c Grѐce (n4).  
216 Ibid, para 21.  
217 Ibid. 
218 Ibid, para 35.  
219 ‘Le requérant allègue qu'il a été obligé de révéler ses convictions religieuses lors de la procédure de 
prestation du serment professionnel prévue par les articles 1 et 22 du code des avocats, au mépris des 







 The Court examined this complaint concerning forced manifestation of religion 
or belief under Article 9 alone;220 the point of law at issue was whether the way in 
which the process of swearing in before the domestic court required the applicant to 
reveal his religious beliefs, in violation of Article 9.221  The ECtHR considered that the 
assumption that lawyers in Greece were Orthodox Christians, and therefore would take 
a religious oath of office,  meant that when the applicant asked to make a solemn 
declaration instead, he was forced by the process, to reveal his religion or belief in part, 
i.e. that he was not an Orthodox Christian.222 The Court examined relevant domestic 
law and found that it supported the applicant’s complaint. Article 19 of the Civil Service 
Code stated that when an oath is required it is in principle a religious oath; in order to be 
allowed to make a solemn declaration it stipulates that individuals are ‘forced to say that 
they are atheists or their religion forbids swearing’.223 
As Chapter Two explained, Alexandridis represented a turning point in terms of the 
clarification and use of the phrase the ‘right not to manifest’; the Court stated that ‘the 
freedom to manifest religious beliefs also has a negative aspect, namely the right of the 
individual not to be compelled to state his faith or his religious beliefs and not to be 
forced to engage in conduct in which it could be inferred that he has –or does not have– 
such beliefs.’224 And, as Chapter Three demonstrated there are various indicators that 
the Court understood the right as a forum internum right in this case. In addition to these 
linguistic hints discussed above, the way in which the Court found a violation of Article 
9 supports this argument. The Court held that the obligation on the applicant to reveal 
                                                                
 
 
220 Ibid.  
221 Ibid, para 35. 
222 Ibid, para 39.  
223 Ibid, para 37. 







that he was not an Orthodox Christian in order to make a solemn declaration ‘infringed 
his right not to be compelled to manifest his religious beliefs’. 225 It was on this basis 
alone that it found a violation of Article 9 of the Convention; there was no consideration 
of limitations applicable only to forum externum rights under Article 9.2.226  
It is important to stress just how strongly the right not to manifest was protected by 
the Court here. Alexandridis was obliged to reveal his religion or belief in part (i.e. that 
he was not an Orthodox Christian); he was not obliged to reveal his actual religion or 
belief, to say that he was atheist or that his religion prohibited swearing. For the Court, 
this was sufficient to constitute a violation of the forum internum right not to manifest, 
and thus Article 9. The fact this decision was unanimous suggests there was consensus 
amongst the judges that the threshold for the violation of the right not to manifest 
religion or belief was low. Moreover, it was enough to show the state had created a 
situation in which individuals were forced to reveal they did not hold a particular belief; 
it was not necessary to prove the state had coerced an individual to reveal their actual 
religion or belief. In both CJ, JJ and EJ and Saniewski there was a notion that the 
applicant must show evidence of ‘suffering’ as a direct result of the disclosure of 
information relating to religion or belief in order for a violation of Article 8 or 9 to be 
found on this basis.227 However, the decision in Alexandridis demonstrated that 
evidence of ‘suffering’ was not necessary; simply, an interference with this forum 
internum right itself was enough to constitute a violation. 
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 Remarkably, there has been almost no discussion of this case in the literature, 
perhaps because it is unreported and available only in French.228 Temperman has argued 
generally that certain oath schemes -which have a religious oath as the ‘default’ option 
and a secular affirmation the ‘tolerated exception’- are objectionable from a human 
rights perspective because there is a presumption that ‘normal’ officers believe in the 
particular god/s sworn to.229 This can mean that non believers or members of minority 
religions, in requesting to make a solemn declaration, are forced to reveal that they do 
not share the dominant faith. He insightfully points out that this is problematic because 
of the risk such individuals may be ostracised or suffer other repercussions230 and those 
affected may decide to surrender their conscience and not speak out. 231  
Two years later Alexandridis, along with Dimitras and others appeared in Dimitras 
et autres c Grѐce, the first in a series of cases concerning oath taking in order to testify 
in Greek courts.232 Again a complaint was made about the process itself. The Greek 
court had presumed that the applicants were Orthodox Christians, therefore, in order for 
them to make a solemn declaration they had been forced to reveal their religion or belief 
in part, i.e. that they were not Orthodox Christians. Furthermore, in some situations had 
been obliged to reveal their actual religion or belief. This, they claimed, violated their 
right not to reveal their religion for belief. 233 
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 Again, the Court treated this complaint under Article 9 alone. The Court found 
the applicants’ complaints to be substantiated. It noted that they had not only been 
obliged to reveal that they were not Orthodox Christians234 but sometimes had to 
convince officials that they were not Orthodox Christians by stating their actual religion 
or belief.235 Indeed, in some instances the words ‘Orthodox Christian’ had been crossed 
out in the minutes and handwritten references, explicitly stating their religion or belief, 
had been entered.236 Unlike Alexandridis, in which religion or belief was revealed in 
part, in Dimitras, therefore, applicants had sometimes been forced to reveal their 
religion or belief in full. The Court found this practice enshrined in domestic law; 
Articles 218 - 220 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which regulated oath taking, 
required individuals to give details about their religion or belief in order to avoid having 
to take the religious oath.237  
 The Court repeated the formulation set in Alexandridis that individuals have a 
right not to be obliged to manifest their religion or beliefs and a right not to be obliged 
to act in such a way that their religion or belief can be deduced.238 It reiterated that 
‘State authorities have no right to intervene in the field of freedom of conscience of the 
individual and seek his religious beliefs, or force him to express his beliefs about the 
divinity’.239 For reasons noted in the analysis of these statements in Alexandridis in 
Chapter Three, this presentation of the right places it the forum internum. Furthermore, 
in Dimitras the Court held that ‘requiring the applicants to reveal their religious 
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convictions in order to be allowed to make a solemn declaration had interfered with 
their freedom of religion’ i.e. their forum internum right.240  
Given this presentation of the right not to manifest as a forum internum right, the 
Court’s conclusion in this case was striking. The Court introduced Article 9.2 
limitations which are appropriate only to forum externum rights; it decided that the 
interference with the right not to manifest was neither justified nor proportionate to the 
aim pursued.241 The reasoning in the first part of Dimitras, therefore, appears to 
completely contradict the reasoning in the second half. It seems that despite the clear 
reliance on Alexandridis the Court fundamentally misunderstood the approach and the 
implications of the language in the previous case. Such a misunderstanding of the nature 
of the right not to manifest could have had serious implications for the protection of this 
right in Dimitras. In the opinion of the Court the interference was prescribed by law and 
pursued a legitimate aim under Article 9.2; the violation of Article 9 was found solely 
on the basis that it was not considered to be justified or proportionate.242 Had the Court 
found differently on this point, then the decision would have been very different.    
 In Chapter One some of the problems with treating forum internum rights as 
forum externum rights were highlighted in relation to the Court’s approach in Buscarini 
in which the Court treated a complaint about compulsion to take a religious oath as a 
forum externum manifestation issue.243 The Court’s approach in Dimitras is somewhat 
more confusing than its approach in Buscarini however. This is because the Court did 
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not treat the complaint as a forum externum issue from the outset. Rather it began by 
(implicitly) recognising the forum internum nature of the right not to manifest. The 
introduction of considerations applicable to the forum externum right to manifest in the 
second part of the judgement appears therefore not only inappropriate but illogical.  
The applicants did not complain that their forum externum right to manifest had 
been restricted, but on the contrary, complained that they had been compelled to 
manifest their religion or belief.244 As Taylor has accurately noted, ‘a legal requirement 
compelling the applicant to act in a particular way is not comparable to a restriction 
which limits the applicant’s chosen outward manifestation of belief’.245 Whilst the 
forum externum reasoning did not, in this case, prove to be an ‘insurmountable hurdle’, 
because a violation of Article 9 was found nonetheless, it is concerning that because of 
the approach alone a very different conclusion could have been reached.   
It is worth noting that further Dimitras et autres v Grѐce cases were examined 
by the ECtHR in 2011246 and 2013.247 In both of these cases the Court considered the 
decision in the first Dimitras decision at length and reached the same conclusion, on the 
basis that the interference with the right not to manifest was not justified or 
proportionate to the aim pursued.248 Despite the clear contrast with the forum internum 
approach of Alexandridis, at no point in either of these later cases did the Court 
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recognise or review the inconsistent way in which the right not to manifest religion or 
belief was treated in the first Dimitras case.   
Again, all Dimitras cases are only available in French and there is almost no 
commentary on them in the literature. One exception is Peroni’s recent article in which 
he commented that this group of cases (‘the Greek cases’) are ‘remarkable’ because of 
the clear willingness on the part of the Court to ‘protect applicants against the slightest 
possibility that may coerce them into revealing their (non-) religious beliefs.’249 Such a 
summary seems questionable. Indeed in Alexandridis the Court offered strong 
protection to this forum internum right but this was based on the existence of 
compulsion to disclose religion or belief in part. Moreover, in the Dimitras cases, in 
which the applicants were sometimes forced to reveal their religion or belief in full, the 
Court’s decision hinged solely on the question of proportionality which actually 
considerably reduced the level of protection afforded to this right in these cases. 
b. Identity Cards 
The only case to date to have raised the right not to manifest in connection with identity 
cards is Sinan Işik v Turkey.  Recording of religious affiliation is a common feature of 
identity cards.250 In Sinan Işik v Turkey the applicant complained firstly, that the 
government had refused to change his religious affiliation from ‘Muslim’ to ‘Alevi’ on 
his identity card and secondly, that he had been obliged, without his consent and in 
breach the right to freedom of religion and conscience, to disclose his belief because it 
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was mandatory to indicate his religion on his identity card.251 This latter complaint will 
form the focus of this section.  
As noted in Chapter Three the statement in this case, that the right not to 
disclose one’s religion or beliefs fell within the forum internum of each individual, 
clarified the nature of the right not to manifest252 as did the statement that the Court 
would examine the complaint from the angle of the ‘negative aspect of freedom of 
religion and conscience, namely the right of an individual not to be obliged to manifest 
his or her beliefs’.253  
The Court rejected the Turkish government’s argument that the indication of 
religion on identity cards in ‘no way constituted a measure aimed at compelling any 
individual to disclose his or her beliefs...’254 Instead, it observed that according to 
domestic legislation at the material time, the applicant was, like all Turkish citizens, 
obliged to carry an identity card indicating his religion; this public document had to be 
shown at the request of any public authority, private enterprise or in the context of other 
formalities.255  The frequent use of the identity card, therefore, meant the applicant was 
forced to disclose his religious beliefs de facto every time he used it.256 
 The Court considered the impact of such disclosure in the context of the Article 
14 right to be free from discrimination. The Court noted that that the indication of 
religious beliefs on official documents (not just ID cards) exposed the bearer to the ‘risk 
of discriminatory situations in their religions with the administrative authorities.’257 In 
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support it referred at length to the Supreme Administrative Court’s judgment in 
Sofianopolous and Others v Greece in which it was noted that the ‘recording of religion 
in identity cards opens the way to positive or negative discrimination and thus creates 
the risk of interference with religious equality.’ 258 
Whilst the Court recognised that, since the complaint, changes had been made to 
the Civil Registry Services Act (2006) –so that individuals could also have information 
amended, deleted or leave the religion or belief on the ID card blank- this remained 
unsatisfactory.259 The Court noted that the fact a religion box remained meant that the 
issue of disclosure remained.260 For the Court a blank box had ‘specific connotation’ 
and could lead to individuals standing out against their will from those who chose to 
have their religion or belief recorded on their identity card.261 Furthermore, it noted that 
legislation required individuals who wanted to change or remove information regarding 
their religion or belief to submit a written statement to the government, a process which 
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could again constitute disclosure of information concerning an aspect of the individual’s 
attitude to religion.262  
That the Article 8 right to privacy was also considered by the Court is revealed 
through the language used in this case. The Court spoke of religion of belief as one of 
the ‘most intimate’ aspects of an individual.263 This echoes the language in Folgerø v 
Norway in which complaints under Article 2 of Protocol 1 concerning opting out of 
compulsory religious education were raised. The Court had noted obiter dicta that 
information about personal religious and philosophical convictions concerned ‘some of 
the most intimate aspects of private life.’264  
The Court found that the Article 14 and 8 implications were ‘undoubtedly at 
odds with the principle of freedom not to manifest one’s religion or belief’; it therefore 
concluded that there had been a violation of Article 9 on the basis that the ID card 
contained an indication of religion, regardless of whether it was obligatory or 
optional.265 Again, therefore, the Court clearly recognised and strongly protected the 
forum internum right not to manifest. 
For Judge Barreto however, this constituted an excessive approach; he argued 
that the majority went beyond the case law upon which they relied in reaching their 
decision.266 He contended that an individual should be ‘at least compelled to disclose 
his or her religion’ in order for a violation of Article 9 to be found; since the change to 
legislation individuals could leave the box blank, therefore there was no compulsion to 
                                                                
 
 
262In support of this reasoning the Court referred to the obiter dicta in in Folgero and Zengin mentioned 
above, see Sinan Işik v Turkey (n4), para 49.  
263 Ibid, para 51. 
264 Folgero and others v Norway (n45) para 98.  
265 Sinan Işik v Turkey (n4) para 52.  







disclose religion or belief.267 There is however a serious flaw in Baretto’s argument. He 
claimed the findings went beyond earlier case law, however, he only explicitly referred 
to the cases of Folgerø v Norway and Zengin v Turkey. In the former case, the Court 
noted obiter dicta that the system for opting out of compulsory religious education did 
not, in principle, actually force parents to reveal their religion or belief, but in reality 
made it highly likely that they felt some compulsion to reveal details about it.268 In the 
latter, the Court held obiter dicta ‘the fact that parents must make a prior declaration to 
schools stating that they belong to the Christian or Jewish faith in order for their 
children to be exempted from the classes in question may raise a problem under Article 
9.’269 At no point did Judge Barreto refer, as the Court did, to Alexandridis. As 
explained above, in Alexandridis the Court found a violation of the right not to manifest 
on the basis that the applicant was forced to reveal his religion or belief in part, i.e. that 
he was not a member of a particular religion; Alexandridis was not compelled to 
actually disclose his religion or belief. In light of this, the findings in both Alexandridis 
and in Işik are consistent. By leaving the box on the ID card blank, individuals are 
forced to reveal their religion or belief in part, namely, that they do not belong to one of 
the optional religions.  
c. School Reports 
In Grzelak v Poland the right not to manifest was again explored in relation to school 
reports.  
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The third applicant raised a number of complaints under Article 9, including the 
complaint that that the lack of a mark for religion/ethics on his school report through his 
school career meant that he was forced to reveal his religious convictions (or lack of) 
each time his school reports were read and this ‘stigmatised’ him among other pupils.270 
This complaint therefore has similarities with CJ, EJ and JJ v Poland and Saniewski.  
 In response the Court repeated the formulation set out in Alexandridis271 and 
explained that an interference with the negative aspect of the right to manifest may 
occur when the State brings about a situation in which individuals are obliged, directly 
or indirectly, to reveal they are non believers.272 The Court added that this negative 
obligation on the part of the state was ‘all the more important when such an obligation 
occurs in the context of the provision of an important public service such as education’, 
an observation found mutatis mutandis, in Alexandridis.273 It considered that the lack of 
a mark for ‘religion/ethics’ on the school report might be read as showing the 
applicant’s lack of religious affiliation.274 Therefore, it concluded that the state’s margin 
of appreciation (with respect to the provision of religious education in school) had been 
exceeded as the ‘very essence of the third applicant’s right not to manifest his religion 
or convictions under Article 9 was infringed.’ 275 
 To this decision, Judge Björgvinsson submitted a dissenting opinion, in which 
he argued there was no violation of Article 9 on this basis because the applicant was not 
subjected to any kind of indoctrination or pressure by authorities regarding his religion 
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or beliefs, neither did he show that he had, or would, suffer detriment which would 
amount to interference.276 Such an argument is however, as Chapter Three 
demonstrated, based on a very narrow and now outdated understanding of forum 
internum rights and the ways in which they can be violated. Furthermore, the reference 
to evidence of suffering repeats the reasoning in the earlier cases of CJ, EJ and JJ and 
Saniewski and ignores the jurisprudence of Alexandridis in which a violation was found 
simply on the basis of being forced to reveal religion or belief in part; evidence of 
‘suffering’ was not necessary.  
 Judge Björgvinsson also referred to Saniewski in his argument that there were 
insufficient grounds for finding differently in Grzelak. Indeed there were some 
similarities, between the cases, but they also had significant differences. Importantly, in 
Saniewski marks were missing for other subjects which meant that no conclusions could 
be drawn from the report itself as to whether the applicant decided not to take religion 
or ethics classes or whether they were simply not offered in that particular year.277 In 
Grzelak, the situation was different. As religious education classes were widely 
available at that time the fact that marks were missing for ‘religion/ethics’ indicated that 
he did not take the classes and thus, was likely that he would be regarded as a person 
without religious beliefs.278 Furthermore, in the Grzelak case a change in the rules 
meant that marks for ‘religion/ethics’ were included in the calculation of the pupil’s 
average mark for the school year. As the Court perceptively noted, this meant that 
opting out of religious education when ethics classes were not available might have an 
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adverse impact on students’ academic achievement overall and put them under some 
pressure to take religious education classes.279  
In Grzelak the majority showed a clear understanding of the meaning, scope and 
nature of the right not to manifest religion or belief. The Court again offered strong 
protection to the right not to manifest religion or belief when it was revealed in part by 
state authorities. 
d. Church Tax 
The case of Spampinato v Italy, in 2006, was the first opting out of payment of church 
tax case to explicitly raise the issue of the right not to manifest religion or belief.280 The 
applicants complained inter alia under Articles 9 and 14 that when they completed their 
tax returns - on which they were required to select whether to allocate eight thousandths 
of their income tax to the State, the Catholic church of to one of the representative 
institutions of five other religious groups- they were obliged to manifest their religious 
beliefs.281 The Court, however, was ‘unable to share the applicants’ view that the 
provision in question entailed an obligation to manifest one’s religious beliefs...’282 It 
noted that according to domestic law283 individuals could choose whether or not to 
make a choice concerning the allocation of income tax, and as such the provision in 
question did not ‘entail an obligation to manifest one’s beliefs.’284 The complaint was 
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therefore declared inadmissible. At no point in this case, therefore, did the Court 
consider that the right not to manifest religion or belief could be engaged by compulsion 
to reveal religion or belief in part.  
 The next case in which the issue of manifestation of religion or belief was raised 
in relation to payment of church tax was in Wasmuth v Allemange in 2011 (i.e. post 
Alexandridis jurisprudence).285 In this case, the applicant complained that his religion or 
belief was revealed by his tax card violating his right not to disclose his religious belief 
and also his right to privacy.286 The card listed six religious organisations entitled to 
receive tax; on Wasmuth’s card the mark ‘-’ appeared in the section entitled ‘church tax 
levy’; this informed his employer than no tax was to be deducted in this respect. This, 
he argued, revealed that he did not belong to one of the six congregations or had opted 
out of the payment of church tax altogether.287  
 The Court examined this complaint under Article 9. It repeated the formulation 
set out in Alexandridis - and thus ostensibly recognised the forum internum nature of the 
right not to manifest.288 It explicitly stated that the obligation imposed on the applicant 
to provide the information in question on his wage-tax card had interfered with his right 
not to indicate his religious beliefs.289 Despite this, however, the Court actually 
considered the legitimacy of limitations on this right under Article 9.2; it concluded that 
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the obligation to provide the information on the wage tax card had a legal basis in 
domestic law and pursued a legitimate aim of protecting the rights of churches and 
religious societies to levy church tax.290 With respect to the question of proportionality 
it considered that the information provided on the tax card was ‘of limited informative 
value’ as it ‘simply indicated that the applicant did not belong to one of the six churches 
or religious societies authorised to levy tax’.291 This it held, did not ‘allow the 
authorities to draw any conclusions as to his religious or philosophical practice’; 
Wasmuth was not forced to give reasons for his non-membership or to reveal his 
religious or philosophical beliefs.292 Furthermore, it observed that the card was not for 
general use but rather only for use in relations between the taxpayer, tax authorities and 
the employer.293 Therefore, it decided there had been no violation of Article 9.294  
This reasoning contrasts sharply with that in Alexandridis, Işik and Grzelak and 
its conclusion seems to be completely at odds with these earlier cases. Arguably, one 
particularly unsatisfactory feature of this judgement is that the Court noted obiter dicta 
that in situations where interference with the right not to manifest is more significant, 
the balancing of interests might lead to a different conclusion.295 This implies that in 
cases where an individual may have been forced to reveal his actual religion or belief or 
give details about it, the Court would treat the right as a forum externum right and 
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subject it to limitations under Article 9.2, rather than a forum internum right. This case 
shows that Taylor’s prediction that European decisions might take into account the 
importance of compulsion to reveal one’s religion or belief in the future, ‘even if only 
for apparently harmless administrative purposes...’ has not occurred.296 
Judges Berro-Lefèvre and Kalaydjieva argued, in their dissenting opinions, that 
this case should have followed the jurisprudence in Işik in which interference was 
considered to be a violation of the forum internum right not to manifest.297 They also 
drew attention to the possible Article 14 implications of the forced disclosure of the 
applicant’s religion or belief through the wage tax card, noting that it could have 
adverse impacts on the applicant’s chances of finding or keeping a job.298 In contrast to 
the Court, therefore, they found a violation of Article 9 in this case.  
Wasmuth, therefore, provides another example of the way in which the right not 
to manifest has been presented as a forum internum right, but has been treated as a 
forum externum right (i.e. subjected to limitations). Again, this case, available only in 
French, has not yet been analysed in the literature. It certainly seems to provide support 
for the hypothesis that if the meaning, scope and nature of the right not to manifest is 
not recognised and it is subjected to Article 9.2 reasoning, then the right not to manifest 
is not adequately protected as a forum internum right.  
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In light of the cases so far, it is necessary to review the literature again. C. Evans had 
argued that following Buscarini, it was unlikely that the Court would develop a more 
sophisticated understanding of the forum internum299 and that the State would have to 
act ‘very repressively indeed’ before the Court would find a violation.300 The findings in 
Alexandridis, Dimitras, Işik and Grzelak have certainly proved this earlier prediction to 
be wrong. However, the cases above do provide evidence (with respect to the right not 
to manifest, at least) to support C. Evans’ suggestion that the adoption of a privacy 
rationale would improve the recognition and protection of forum internum rights by the 
ECtHR.301  
In fact, recently Peroni has argued that the increased weight given to privacy and 
autonomy, by the Court with respect to religion and belief has led to a more vigorous 
protection of the forum internum.302 He argues that the Court has been ‘highly 
protective of the ‘negative aspect’ of the right to manifest one’s religion’ protecting the 
‘the private character of applicants’ (non) religious beliefs by protecting them against 
forced access and exposure’.303 A similar observation was made by Martinez-Torron 
who suggests that ‘the Court has been very careful to protect the individual’s right not 
to disclose, even indirectly, religion or beliefs.’304 However, whilst this may be an 
accurate reflection of the Court’s approach in Alexandridis, Işik and Grzelak (and at a 
stretch, the Dimitras cases) this does not represent the apparently, ‘deviant’ judgment in 
                                                                
 
 
299 C Evans (n3) 74.  
300 Ibid, 78.  
301 Ibid, 32. 
302 See L Peroni (n8).  
303 Ibid, 6. See also P Petkoff who speaks of the private autonomous sphere of religion or belief, P Petkoff 
(n87).  







Wasmuth in which no violation was found on the basis of disclosure of religion or belief 
in part.   
Conclusion   
This chapter has analysed the way in which the right not to manifest religion or belief 
has been protected in the case law of the ECtHR. It found that in Alexandridis the Court 
clearly recognised and protected the forum internum nature of this right. This case has 
been used a precedent in all subsequent right not to manifest cases. There has, since 
2008, been somewhat of a trend in case law to find a violation of Article 9 on the basis 
of compulsion to disclose religion or belief. This trend can even be seen in the cases of 
Dimitras, in which the right not to manifest was subject to limitations applicable only to 
forum externum rights. Despite, it seems, fundamentally misunderstanding the 
reasoning in Alexandridis, and thus considerably reducing the level of protection 
offered to the right not to manifest, the Court nevertheless found a violation of Article 9. 
However, the case of Wasmuth represents a challenge to this post 2008 trend. The Court 
again subjected this apparently forum internum right to limitations applicable only to 
forum externum rights.  Despite finding an interference with the right not to manifest, 
the Court concluded that, according to Article 9.2 limitations this interference did not 
constitute a violation of Article 9.  This inconsistency in the approach to and protection 
of the right not to manifest in judgments of the ECtHR, therefore, provides further 
support that if the meaning, scope and nature of the right not to manifest is not 
recognised then the right will not be adequately protected as a forum internum right.  
So to the answer to the question of whether the right not to manifest is the 
opposite to the right to manifest in terms of protection the answer must be both yes and 







sometimes protected as a forum internum right and sometimes as a forum externum 
right. The current situation is therefore problematic because there is no predictability in 





























This dissertation has explored the following research questions: what is the meaning 
and scope of the right not to manifest? What is the nature of the right not to manifest 
and how can it be interfered with? And, how and why has the right not to manifest been 
protected by the Court? The hypothesis, that if the meaning, scope and nature of the 
right not to manifest is not adequately understood, then the right will not be protected 
adequately by the Court as a forum internum right, was also posed. In order to address 
the research questions and hypothesis it was necessary to engage with a significant 
amount of ECtHR case law not yet analysed, and available only in French, and a wide 
variety of literature on Article 9. 
The first chapter explored fundamental concepts in Article 9. It found a 
significant lack of consensus concerning key terms such as ‘religion’ and ‘belief’,305 and 
drew attention to some methods used by the Court in order to avoid defining these 
terms.306 It also found some serious confusion with respect to the Court’s understanding 
and application of the forum internum and forum externum distinction.307 This chapter 
therefore provided a contextual background against which the Article 9 right not to 
manifest was analysed in the subsequent chapters. 
Chapter Two explored the first research question concerning the meaning and 
scope of the right not to manifest, in terms of the way in which it was presented in case 
law and described in the literature. It discovered that the right not to manifest refers to 
the right not to disclose information relating to religion or belief through statements or 
acts, rather than the right not to manifest religion or belief through worship, teaching, 
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practice or observance. However, it revealed tremendous conceptual variation with 
respect this phrasing of this right in case law and a fundamental misunderstanding of 
this right in literature.308 It argued that the language of manifestation to describe this 
right is misleading and unhelpful. In order for the right not to manifest to be considered 
the opposite of the right to manifest it is necessary to stretch the ‘to manifest’ beyond its 
usual meaning, to include ‘to disclose’ and ‘to reveal’.  
Chapter Three examined the second research question concerning the nature of 
the right not to manifest, in terms of the distinction between forum internum and forum 
externum rights, again according to how it was presented in case law and in the 
literature. It found that in the literature it is generally considered to be a forum internum 
right,309 however, this is far from clear from the way it is described in case law. It drew 
attention to the problematic description of this right as the ‘negative aspect’ of either the 
right to manifest or freedom of religion.310 A close examination of semantics in this 
chapter revealed that generally speaking the right not to manifest was conceived of as a 
forum internum right and therefore could be considered the opposite to forum externum 
right to manifest, in terms of its nature.  
Following this, Chapter Four and Five examined the third research question 
concerning how and why the right not to manifest was protected by the ECnHR and 
ECtHR when the right was applied to the facts of the case in question. Chapter Four 
examined how and why the right not to manifest was treated in admissibility decisions 
of the Commission. It found that the Commission was reluctant to recognise the 
existence of the right not to manifest and when it did do so, it examined the right under 
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Article 8, thus treating it as a qualified, forum externum right.  Chapter Five analysed 
how and why the right was protected in judgements of the ECtHR. It found that 
following Alexandridis in 2008, the Court presented the right to manifest in all 
subsequent cases as a forum internum right which could not be limited by the state. 
However, when it applied the right to the facts of the case, the Court often treated this 
right as a qualified right and subjected it to limitations under Article 9.2. This chapter 
therefore demonstrated inconsistencies not only between judgements but within 
judgements.  In sum, in terms of protection of this right these chapters found that the 
right not to manifest was considered opposite to the forum externum right to manifest 
when treated as a forum internum right, but the same as the right to manifest when 
treated as a forum externum right. In light of these findings it would be it would be 
interesting to conduct further research on the consistency of the ECtHR’s approach 
towards other Article 9 rights.  
 
At this point it is worth reflecting on reasons for the apparently confused and 
contradictory case law concerning the right not to manifest. The most obvious 
explanation is that the Court is simply unable to distinguish clearly and consistently 
between the fora. Indeed, the contradictory reasoning within Dimitras and Wasmuth, 
may support the view that the Court lacks the necessary ‘intellectual and conceptual 
architecture to deal with the increasingly challenging Article 9 cases.’311 There are 
however some other possible explanations.  
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One possibility is that the inconsistencies in case law relating to the right not to 
manifest indicate that the Court no longer considers the forum internum/forum internum 
distinction to be useful. Indeed, the distinction between these fora was, as noted in 
Chapter One, introduced by the Court and it has occasionally struggled to apply this 
distinction in practice since.312 It may be that, given the variation and complexity of 
Article 9 case law, the Court is moving away from the protection of some rights as 
forum internum and others as forum externum. There is an emerging view that certain 
Article 9 rights do not need to be protected as absolute rights because protections under 
Article 9.2 are ‘robust’ and therefore a violation will found, if necessary, regardless of 
the approach. Indeed, the fact that a violation of Article 9 was found in both 
Alexandridis and Dimitras, despite the different approaches, certainly provides evidence 
for this.  
Another possibility is that the consideration of Article 9.2 limitations in Wasmuth is 
an attempt to ‘reign in’ the level of protection offered to the right not to manifest in 
earlier cases. The Court had strongly protected not only the right not to reveal religion 
or belief in full but also the right not to reveal religion or belief in part (i.e. that an 
individual did not adhere to a particular religion or belief).313 Dissenting voices in 
earlier cases had certainly criticised this latter approach.314 Perhaps given the issue in 
Wasmuth was about disclosure of religion or belief in part, the Court reduced the level 
of protection offered from absolute, to qualified, protection on this basis. A reduction in 
the extent of protection offered to rights can be seen elsewhere in Article 9 case law. In 
the extremely controversial case of Lautsi v Italy in 2009, for instance, the Court 
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permitted wide state latitude in respect of the right to manifest315 but this was 
significantly reduced by the Grand Chamber in 2011.316   
Whatever the case may be it is essential for the Court to clarify the understanding 
and protection of the right not to manifest religion or belief in order to become a more 
consistent and reliable guarantor of this right. In light of the findings in this dissertation, 
it is recommended that two significant changes need to be made.  
The first suggestion is that the right not to manifest should be reconceptualised as 
the right to refrain from disclosing religion or belief.317 This dissertation has argued that 
it is difficult to ascertain the meaning of this right from its description as the right not to 
manifest religion or belief. Alston has perceptively highlighted problems of defining 
something by what it is not rather than what it is.318 This is further problematic with 
respect to the right not to manifest because, as the cases analysed above have revealed, 
this right does not protect the choice not to manifest religion or belief in public or in 
private in the common sense (i.e. in worship, teaching, practice or observance). Rather it 
protects the right not to be forced to reveal or disclose religion or belief. This is 
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something different from manifestation in the usual sense. The language of 
manifestation therefore seems entirely inappropriate to describe this right. It would be 
much more logical for the Court to move away from the phrase ‘right not to manifest’ 
altogether and use the language of disclosure instead. It also seems necessary to move 
away from the problematic characterisation of this right as the ‘negative aspect’ of 
either the right to manifest, or of freedom of religion. There does not seem to be a good 
reason to further complicate the understanding of the nature of this right by framing it as 
a right ‘not to’, or a ‘negative’ Article 9 right.319 Rather this right could be framed in a 
positive way so that it is clear that it is a right in and of its own, instead of part of 
another Article 9 right. Bearing these points in mind, therefore, it is suggested that this 
right should be referred to as the right to refrain from disclosing religion or belief.320   
The second suggestion is that the absolute right to refrain from disclosing religion or 
belief should only be applied in situations where there has been no positive action on 
the part of the claimant on the basis of religion or belief. In light of the case law 
analysed above it seems that the right to refrain from revealing religion or belief to the 
state, whether in full or in part, should be treated as an absolute right. This should apply 
in all situations where there has been no action on the part of the claimant. In contrast, 
where there has been some positive action on the part of the claimant on the basis of 
their religion or belief, for instance opting out of certain legal duties such as military 
                                                                
 
 
319 The meaning of ‘negative’ rights in Article 9 is far from widely understood.  
320 The phrase the ‘right to withhold information about religion or belief’ has been used in relation to 
Article 18 in C Heyns, P W Edge and F Viljoen, Legal Responses to Religious Difference (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers 2002), 48. This is, however, somewhat problematic because it does not obviously 
encapsulate the right not to act in such a way that religion or belief can be deduced which is also 
encompassed by the right not to manifest (Sinan Işik v Turkey (n4) para 41). The phrase ‘right to refrain 
from a religious affiliation’ used in Article 24of Solvakian Constitution, see Klein v Slovakia App no 







service or payment of taxes, then it should be treated as a qualified right.321 This 
argument is based on the understanding that the rationale for the protection of the right 
to refrain from disclosing religion or belief is privacy (i.e. the protection against 
unwarranted State interference in the personal sphere). Once an individual has 
positively ‘acted’ on the basis of their religion or belief, i.e. they have specifically 
requested to opt out the payment of church tax on the basis of their religion or belief, 
then it can be argued that in doing so they have actually manifested their religion or 
belief, and thus moved the issue from the forum internum to the forum externum. They 
are no longer simply holding a religion or belief ‘silently’ and thus entitled to absolute 
protection from state interference322 but rather, instead, to qualified protection according 
to the right to manifest.323  
This is congruent with the Court’s jurisprudence elsewhere. Requests to access 
special privileges granted by domestic law on the basis of religion or belief, such as 
time off from public employment, for instance, have been considered to be 
manifestations or religion or belief. Furthermore, such requests must substantiated by 
the individual through the disclosure of his or her religion or belief.324 This was set out 
in Kosteski v Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia which concerned absence from 
                                                                
 
 
321 This is similar to M Nowak’s argument that freedom of conscience enjoys absolute protection as long 
as the actions of an individual do not affect the ‘rights and freedoms of others’. According to Nowak, 
once freedom of conscience leaves the ‘sphere of privacy, as in the case of refusal to perform legal duties 
(e.g., duty to pay taxes or serve in the military), they are protected by Art. 18 only when they represent a 
practice or some other form of public manifestation of a religion or a belief. But even in this case, they 
are subject to the limitations found in para. 3.’ See M Nowak (n66) 315.  
322 See P Slotte (n38) 268. 
323 In addition to active and passive manifestations, Hambler also speaks of a ‘negative manifestation’ 
which he categorises as taking the form of request for time off to fulfil religious obligations or abstention 
from certain duties for reasons of religious convictions, see Hambler in Dingemans and others (n7) 88.  
324 J Murdoch notes that forcing an individual to disclose his beliefs may only undermine this aspect of 
Article when the state ‘cannot advance any compelling justification for this’; he suggests that such a 
justification may arise when a individual seeks to take advantage of a ‘special privilege’ available in 
domestic law on the grounds of religion or belief, see J Murdoch, Freedom of Thought, Conscience and 
Religion: A Guide to the Implementation of Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights 







work during a religious holiday.325 The Court recognised that the ‘notion of the state 
sitting in judgment on a citizens inner and personal beliefs is abhorrent and may smack 
unhappily of past infamous persecutions’ but stated that where an individual seeks to 
enjoy a special right bestowed by domestic law, it was ‘not oppressive or in any 
fundamental conflict with freedom of conscience to require some level of 
substantiation...and if that substantiation is not forthcoming to reach a negative 
conclusion.’326 Practically, this makes sense because if the right to refrain from 
disclosing religion or belief was protected as a forum internum right in circumstances 
where claims were made by an applicant on the basis of their religion or belief in order 
to access a special right, states would not be able to seek substantiation for such claims; 
such privileges could, therefore, become abused. This approach is consistent with the 
developing views of some HRC Committee Members. Recently, in  Kim et al v 
Republic of Korea, for instance, it was explained that ‘[t]he absolute right not to be 
compelled to reveal one’s thoughts or belief is the right to remain silent and not the 
right to raise claims vis-à-vis the State without giving any reasons.’327   
However, in order for this suggestion to assist in clarifying the current situation 
it would be necessary for the scope of ‘positive actions’ on the basis of religion or belief 
(or manifestations) to be clarified. As Peroni has pointed out, currently it is difficult to 
                                                                
 
 
325 Ibid.  
326 Kosteski v Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (n4) para 33. In this case no violation was found, 
however, in similar future cases the Court might find differently in light of  SAS v France, in which the 
Court stressed, in respect of the government’s request for proof of religion or belief, that ’the State’s duty 
of neutrality and impartiality is incompatible with any power on the State’s part to assess the legitimacy 
of religious beliefs of the ways in which those beliefs are expressed’, see SAS v France (n12) paras 54-55 
and also the earlier case of Eweida and others v United Kingdom (n2) para 81. 
327 Individual Opinion of Committee member Mr. Walter Kälin (concurring) (Appendix III), Kim et al v 
Republic of Korea, Human Rights Committee, UN Doc CCPR/C/106/D/178/2008 Communication no 
1786/2008 (1 February 2013)., (my emphasis).A similar view was expressed in the Individual opinion of 
Committee member Sir Nigel Rodley, jointly with members Mr. Krister Thelin and Mr. Cornelis 







identify the parameters of manifestation.328 This is of concern here because even the 
‘belief- centred’ cases (examined above) could be interpreted as revolving around some 
form of ‘external action’ which may be interpreted as a manifestation of religion or 
belief. For instance, a request to make a solemn declaration rather than take a religious 
oath could considered be considered a special request (and thus a manifestation) made 
on the basis of religion or belief.329  In order to avoid such a broad interpretation, and 
therefore to avoid the right to refrain from disclosing religion or belief from becoming a 
hypothetical rather than actionable right, it would be necessary to set out precisely 
which specific requests for exemptions from legal duties constitute manifestations.330  
In terms of the cases examined above, it is hypothesised that if the Court had 
referred to the right not to manifest as the right to refrain from disclosing religion or 
belief, and treated it as an absolute right where there had been no action on the part of 
the claimant, then, actually, the decisions would have remained the same. However, the 
presentation of the right, in terms of its meaning and nature, would have been much 
clearer and the treatment of the right when applied to the facts of the case would have 
been more consistent. This is because the significant conceptual variation with respect 
to the description of this right would have been avoided, as would have the confusing 
construal of this right as a ‘negative aspect’ of another Article 9. Finally, the 
contradictory reasoning within the judgements would have been avoided. At the outset, 
there would have been clear recognition at the outset of the case that this is to be treated 
as an absolute right where there has been no action on the part of the applicant, and as a 
                                                                
 
 
328 L Peroni (n8) 18. 
329 Ibid.  
330 J Murdoch pointed out that in Kosteski v former Yugoslavia of Macedonia, the qualification ‘privilege 
or entitlement not commonly available’ suggests a restricted application of this principle, see J Murdoch 







qualified right when the applicant has sought to access special privileges on the basis of 
religion or belief.  
 
This dissertation has, for the first time, systematically analysed the right not to 
manifest religion or belief. It has discovered that ECtHR judgements often appear 
confused and contradictory with respect to this right, in that the Court always presents 
the right not to manifest as an absolute right, yet in some cases, treats it as a qualified 
right and subjects it to limitations under Article 9.2. It was suggested that in order to 
improve the understanding and protection of the right not to manifest this right should 
be reconceptualised as the right to refrain from disclosing religion or belief. It was also 
suggested that the right to refrain from disclosing religion or belief should be treated as 
an absolute right in situations where there has been no positive action on the part of the 
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